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ABSTRACT

RACE, ETHNICITY, ECONOMICS, AND FEDERALISM: STATE
SENTIMENT REGARDING NONCITIZENS FROM 2009 TO 2014

Timothy Márquez, PhD
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2017
Scot Schraufnagel, Director

The dissertation examines the causes and means of state legislative action on immigration
in the United States along a range of policy issues from 2009 to 2014. The work begins by
placing the phenomenon of immigration restriction and accommodation in its historical context,
alongside other instances of localized opposition to demographic change. Next, I examine the
state-level demographic changes which occurred during the last Census period, from 2001 to
2010. I find that Latino population growth occurred heaviest in rural states with large African
American populations. I then turn to analyze state restrictions placed on noncitizens residing in
the American states. I find that the growth rates of the foreign-born, Asian, and Latino
populations all associate with restriction. Also, states with weaker economies and conservative
populations tended to adopt restrictive immigration policies. Following this, I examine state
accommodations and find that the respective sizes of the foreign-born, Asian, and Latino
populations are associated with accommodation, suggesting that these groups demonstrate
cohesiveness and look out for noncitizens that are affected by state policies. After considering

both restrictions and accommodations separately, I create a sentiment score which measures each
state’s overall policy posture on the issue of immigration. This score differentiates states such
that a state with many accommodations and fewer restrictions is ranked higher than a state with
few accommodations and many restrictions, and vice versa. Models are developed to explain
these scores. I find that the states altered their behavior in 2012, and from that year on they enact
more accommodations than restrictions. I conclude by examining the role of immigration in the
2016 presidential election. I find that as states are less accommodating and more restrictive,
Trump’s probability of winning the state went up, controlling for other factors.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This dissertation will examine the entry of the American states into immigration policy
and the diffusion of state policies towards immigrants. From 2001 to 2016, the national
government failed to satisfactorily address the status of millions of noncitizens residing in the
U.S. without authorization. During this period, the American states enacted policies regarding
both authorized and unauthorized noncitizens. In this chapter I will first outline a general history
of actions that fall into the nexus between migration and race. In Chapter Two, I examine the
root causes of shifting demographics in the states. Then, in Chapters Three and Four, an
examination will be made of the types of policies that states enacted regarding noncitizens.
Some of these policies are classified as restrictions on noncitizens because they limit access to
public benefits, types of employment, and otherwise inhibit the ability of noncitizens to
participate in the full life of a community. Others are classified as accommodations because they
extend some benefits and/or protections to noncitizens. I develop a schema for distinguishing
between restrictions and accommodations, and uncover the factors which lead to the enactment
of both. In Chapter Five, I design a means of rating each state’s stance on immigration, updating
a score by Timothy Márquez and Scot Schraufnagel (2013).
This research is important for several reasons. First, any policy concerning noncitizens
will also touch upon race and ethnicity, because three out of four immigrants to the U.S. since
1965 have been either Latino or Asian (Lopez, Passel, and Rohal 2015). Further, this research
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will explore the manner in which noncitizens are treated on a policy level by the American
states. How do states restrict noncitizens, and how do they accommodate noncitizens? This
dissertation will attempt to uncover patterns in the types of laws enacted and the effect of such
laws. Finally, state policies may influence migration patterns, which in turn will influence the
2020 Census. The results of the Census will influence representation in Congress and the
Electoral College. Thus, this research will cast light on several different important emerging
trends in American government.
This chapter will introduce the reader to the topic in several ways. First, I describe
historical examples where the growth of racial and ethnic minority groups led to either a national
or local reaction. I use Stephen Skowronek’s (1993) theory of regime politics to provide context
to the action or inaction of the federal government during these periods. Then, I cover the
relevant literature concerning immigration, race and ethnicity, and intergovernmental relations.
The current trend of state action concerning noncitizens occurs during a period of increased state
governmental policy activity, dubbed New Federalism. Additionally, later chapters will find an
association between state activity and the size and growth of a state’s Latino population. Finally,
I end this chapter with an outline of the remaining chapters.
From the Fourteenth Amendment to Proposition 187

The direction that the nation takes with regards to civil liberties and civil rights has a
great deal to do with regime politics and what Stephen Skowronek has called "political time"
(1993). Skowronek has described how political regimes can emerge and persist through time
around the locus of reconstructive presidents like Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Delano
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Roosevelt. A successful political regime can preempt, ignore, or challenge state policies because
the existence of a political regime at the national level which will set a clear policy direction for
the country. Conversely, divided government and party polarization result in the inability of the
national government to signal a clear direction on immigration. If an issue occurs during the
administration of a disjunctive or pre-emptive president, the national government may be
paralyzed or may send different signals from the separate branches, and states may assert their
authority on the matter. Further, since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
subsequent incorporation of the Bill of Rights upon the states, state policies can also be
challenged in federal court by individuals under that amendment's due process clause. The
inauguration of President Donald J. Trump in 2017 ushers in a period of unified government, and
it is possible that the national government will now adopt a unified stance of restricting
immigration.
Since the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a subsequent series of Supreme
Court rulings, immigration and citizenship have been regulated by the national government. The
Fourteenth Amendment will therefore form a point of departure for this chapter’s survey of
historical cases of actions that are traced by the migration of large numbers of minority groups.
Passed during an era of Republican control over the national government, the Fourteenth
Amendment established a national citizenship that did not depend on skin color or previous
condition of servitude. Nor did it depend on the state where a person resided. With regards to
immigration policy, this national conception of citizenship was first tested by a California law
that empowered a state commissioner of immigration to bar entry into the U.S. via California’s
ports of call. The Supreme Court struck down this law in 1875, opining that “the passage of laws
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which concern the admission of citizens . . . of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress,
and not to the states" (Chy Lung v. Freeman 1875). Since this decision by the Supreme Court,
the determination of qualifications for entry into the U.S. has resided with the national
government. In order to illustrate how national policies concerning immigration can affect
demographics, Table 1-1 below displays the Chinese population of the U.S. in selected decades
from 1850 to the present.
Table 1-1: Growth of the Chinese Population & Related Legislation
DECADE
1850
1860
1870
1880

NUMBER OF CHINESE RESIDENTS IN U.S.A.
4,018
34,933
63,199
105,465
1882 - CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT
1890
107,488
1900
89,863
1910
71,531
1920
61,639
1930
74,954
1940
77,504
1943 – CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT REPEALED
1950
117,629
1960
237,292
1965 – IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION ACT
1970
436,062
1980
812,178
1990
1,645,472
2000
2,432,585
According to Census data, the Chinese population of the U.S. went from 4,018 in 1850 to
105,465 in 1880, mostly in California and the western territories. Naturally, the rapid growth of
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this non-white group prompted a backlash. Although Chinese immigrants faced local opposition,
the national government preempted the states by passing the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.
This barred immigration from China to the United States. For decades after this, only Chinese
men emigrated to the U.S. in order to make money before returning to China. Consequently, by
the 1890 Census the size of America’s Chinese population reached a plateau of 107,488. These
data illustrate the effectiveness of a preemptive national policy to curtail the growth of a then
undesirable out-group. The remaining Chinese would go on to face similar discrimination as
African Americans after the Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). It wouldn’t
be until the middle of the twentieth century that the Chinese population would begin to grow
again at a sustained, double-digit rate.
After the contested election of 1877, Republican Rutherford B. Hayes took office and
promptly withdrew federal troops from the South who had been stationed to protect African
Americans and northern "carpetbaggers" from attacks by the Ku Klux Klan. The effect of this
“corrupt bargain,” which involved the disposition of electors from South Carolina, Florida, and
Louisiana, was that discriminatory laws aimed at freedmen were passed in southern states over
time, restricting their movement, employment, voting rights, and economic opportunities (Oakes
et al 566-567). These “Jim Crow” laws were legitimized by the Supreme Court case Plessy v.
Ferguson (1896), which introduced the legal concept of “separate but equal.” In addition to the
threat of lynching, a black person in some jurisdictions could find himself spending several years
at hard labor for the relatively minor crime of vagrancy, a phenomenon that Douglas A.
Blackmon has dubbed "slavery by another name" (2008).
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Between 1915 and 1970, millions of African Americans left the Jim Crow South for
better opportunities in northern and western urban areas (Wilkerson 2010). In the 1910's,
550,000 blacks left the South (161); in the 1920's, 903,000 migrated north and west (217); in the
1930's, 480,000 departed (218); 1.6 million migrated in the 1940's (218); 1.4 million migrated in
the 1950's (218); and about 1 million left the South in the 1960's (218). The right to travel is not
proscribed by the Constitution and is mentioned in Corfield v. Coryell (1823) as one of the
"privileges and immunities" that citizens of the United States possess. Therefore, it could be
argued that the national government could do little to stop African Americans from migrating
north and west, even if there were a will to do so outside of the South, where "anti-enticement"
and vagrancy laws were used to prevent black people from migrating (Wilkerson 162).
Ultimately, racial bigotry followed in the wake of migration (Arneson 2003). Segregated
housing laws soon appeared in northern cities, and tensions flared with white union workers (1317). During the “Red Summer” of 1919, dozens of African Americans were lynched in East
Saint Louis, IL and Chicago, IL (166-168, 205). When these states saw their black population
rise sharply they adopted some of the legal and extralegal policies of the Jim Crow South.
In contrast to the Great Migration, where the national government neither prevented
African Americans from travelling nor protected them from racial segregation and lynching in
the North, the national government took substantial action in other cases concerning minority
groups. In the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Roosevelt administration took
decisive and preemptive action against the ethnic groups that America found itself at war with:
Germans, Italians, and Japanese. Although the United States tracked, arrested, and imprisoned
members of all of these nationalities, Japanese Americans were subject to greater scrutiny and a
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larger scale internment than Italians or Germans. It seems self-evident that Japanese Americans
faced greater hardships because they were non-white. According to the Harry S. Truman Library
and Museum, over 110,000 people of Japanese descent were relocated from the West Coast to
internment camps, and over 60% of those Japanese were natural-born American citizens. 1 I
0F

interpret this as a preemptive act by a political regime: had the national government not acted
swiftly against Japanese Americans, the states probably would have acted against them, either
through statute or through extralegal acts of violence. Notably, the internment was not an act of
Congress, but rather a product of Executive Order 9066 issued by President Roosevelt in
February of 1942; yet, Congress provided for its implementation (Robinson 2001, 125-128).
Latinos have been a presence in the American Southwest since the Mexican-American
War of 1846-48, when the United States annexed what is today California, Nevada, Colorado,
New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah. Concurrent with the Great Migration of African Americans,
large numbers of Latinos crossed the border between Mexico and the United States to work in
agriculture and other low-paying or temporary work, particularly in California and Texas.
Before the creation of the Border Patrol in 1924, there was no systematic means of preventing
such crossings. Further, between 1860 and 1920, Mexicans were classified as "white" by the
U.S. Census (Campbell and Lennon 1999). This makes determining the growth of the Latino
population of the United States difficult. However, it is safe to say that the Latino population of
the United States grew substantially during the early decades of the twentieth century, as both
authorized and unauthorized noncitizens crossed the border to seek employment, especially when
immigration from Europe dropped in the years during World War I. For seasonal workers from

1

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/japanese_internment/1948.htm
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Mexico, the creation of the Border Patrol may have had the perverse effect of causing them to
remain in the States rather than cross back into Mexico and risk being unable to cross again at
will.
The Latino population has historically experienced tension with the majority white
population (see Gordon 1999 for an examination of historical Anglo/Mexican tensions).
However, these tensions did not mirror the widespread lynching of African Americans
throughout the American South. In the case of noncitizens, the option of deportation existed to
control the population of a potentially undesirable group. This was not a policy choice that was
available for either states or the federal government to use towards African Americans during the
Great Migration. During the 1930's, the Roosevelt administration deported several hundred
thousand Mexicans; between 1930 and 1934, more than 350,000 people moved from the United
States to Mexico, either voluntarily or, more often, involuntarily (Alanís Enciso 2011, 56).
Contemporaries recalled that Mexicans were rounded up, placed on train cars, and sent to
Mexico, sometimes without regard to citizenship status (Sánchez 1993, 224). Conversely, from
1942 to 1964, the U.S. government entered an arrangement with the Mexican government to
allow Mexican nationals to work on temporary visas in the United States. This was called the
Bracero program and the Mexicans who took part were called "braceros". The greater ability of
the federal government to manage the Latino population may have contributed to lower
incidences of extralegal, local action against Latinos like lynching. Put another way, the
deportation of undesirable noncitizens may have preempted the sort of state and localized actions
that African Americans, who were U.S. citizens, faced.
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Another national action that can be characterized as somewhat preemptive was dubbed
"Operation Wetback", in which the U.S. Border Patrol deported over 1 million illegal immigrants
from Mexico between 1954 and 1955 in what Michael Snodgrass has characterized as "a military
style dragnet" (2011, 91-92). Whereas the Bracero program was approved by Congress,
Operation Wetback was entirely the product of executive action by the Eisenhower
administration. In this sense, Operation Wetback resembled the internment of the Japanese,
which was also initiated by the executive branch. The reason the Eisenhower administration
took this action is that, along with braceros, unauthorized noncitizens were crossing the border
and competing with both citizens and braceros for low-paying work.
The 1960's and 70's brought with them a shift in attitudes regarding women and
minorities. In particular, African Americans and immigrants from Asia and Latin American
countries saw advancements in their status before the law. Beginning with a favorable Supreme
Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and proceeding through several civil rights
and voting acts in the 1960's, the post-Roosevelt Democrats gradually dismantled the de jure
segregation that had originated a century before. Regarding immigration, Congress did away
with quotas with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. Subsequent census tabulations
show an uptick in the number of Asians in the United States. Referring to Table 1-1, the Chinese
population of the U.S. went from 237,292 in 1960 to 2,432,585 in 2000, a tenfold increase in
forty years.
Although the New Deal regime had collapsed by 1980, the New Right regime that
succeeded it seemed, at first, open to immigration. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan signed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act, which created penalties for knowingly hiring illegal
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immigrants, but also granted amnesty to millions of undocumented aliens living in the United
States at the time. Further, the Immigration Act of 1990, signed by President George H. W.
Bush, increased the total immigration limit. However, in 1996 the restrictive Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act was signed by President Clinton. This bill may have
been enacted in order to alleviate fears that the North American Free Trade Agreement would
result in more illegal immigration. The 1996 Act was the last time Congress and the president
were able to agree on immigration, with the exception of terrorism-related border security
policies. In the mid-2000's, Congress debated several immigration reform bills, but with the
New Right regime waning, immigration became a cross-cutting cleavage for the Republican
Party: pro-business Republicans favored immigration reform because of the promise of
inexpensive labor, while social conservatives were opposed to an influx of non-European
immigrants (Jeong, Miller, Schofield, and Sened 2011).
Recently, the US Congress considered but failed to pass comprehensive immigration
reform in 2005 with the Secure America and Orderly Immigration Act, and again in 2006 and
2007 with two Comprehensive Immigration Reform Acts. Moreover, since 2001 members of
Congress have introduced several pieces of legislation under the heading Development, Relief,
and Education for Alien Minors or DREAM Acts, which have failed to become law. Members in
the House of Representatives passed one such measure in December of 2010 and senators
subsequently debated the act, but the legislation failed to garner the 60 votes required to invoke
cloture and allow for a Senate floor vote. With bipartisan support, the Senate passed the Border
Security, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act in 2013, but Republican
Speaker John Boehner refused to bring it to a vote in the House. In June 2012, the Obama
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Administration issued an order aimed to protect immigrants who would have been eligible for
relief under the 2010 DREAM Act, granting them work permits and relief from deportation.
This program was called Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and had the effect of
protecting unauthorized noncitizens who were brought to the U.S. as children from deportation,
provided they had no criminal convictions. The federal government began accepting
applications for benefits under the program in August of 2012. In 2014, the Obama
administration attempted to expand this program to include parents of U.S. citizens, but Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans (DAPA) was opposed by several states and ultimately halted by
a federal court in Texas v. U.S. (2015). The Obama administration appealed this ruling, but a 4-4
Supreme Court ruling in U.S. v. Texas (2016) left the lower court ruling in place.
The States Shoulder into Immigration Policy
Although non-white immigrants often faced the same localized discrimination as nonwhite Americans, states rarely made policy specifically controlling immigrants. A rare exception
was Proposition 187, the “Save Our State” ballot initiative passed by California’s voters in 1994.
This referendum denied unauthorized noncitizens access to publicly-funded social services.
Though eventually overturned in federal court, Proposition 187 can be seen as a precursor to
more recent efforts to deny social services to unauthorized noncitizens. In the last decade, states
have passed hundreds of bills that directly or indirectly impact both authorized and unauthorized
noncitizens. The majority of recent immigrants originate from either Asia or Latin America
(Larsen 2004). Both groups have faced racial and ethnic discrimination in American history.
This discrimination has at times come at the hands of state and local government, at times by the
national government, and at times by both. Yet, on other occasions the different governments of
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the United States have been conflicted over the treatment of minority groups, with the national
government preempting, challenging, or ignoring state actions. The 1965 Voting Rights Act
would qualify as an example where the national government explicitly challenged state and local
policies which prevented African Americans from being able to vote.
States, like the national government, can adopt policies across an overlapping spectrum
of issue areas. The degree to which the national government will allow state policymaking
leadership in certain areas will depend on a number of factors. One is the issue area. The
Lochner-era Supreme Court struck down state laws that regulated business, but the Rehnquist
Court was more accepting of state regulatory policy (Pickerill and Clayton 2004). Policies that
touch upon civil liberties and civil rights are more complex, though. State policies can be shown
to originate from a combination of internal and external factors. With the failure to enact
immigration reform at the national level, states have since jumped into the immigration debate.
The National Conference of State Legislatures has tracked state immigration policymaking since
2005. Figure 1-1, below, displays the number of laws enacted by the states from 2009 to 2014,
the period covered by this study. I chose this period mainly because it allows for most similar
systems design, or Mill’s method of difference (George and Bennett 2005). The occupant of the
White House is held constant in this period. President Obama’s administration generally favored
immigration reform that would have included a path to citizenship for at least some unauthorized
noncitizens. That said, hostility from Republicans in Congress thwarted his efforts in this area,
and so the Obama years were largely devoid of significant national action on immigration apart
from DACA. Also, the years 2009 to 2014 capture a period of sustained, heightened activity
regarding noncitizens by the states. Though the NCSL database goes to 2008, that would change

13
the presidential variable. Figure 1-1excludes commemorative legislation, budget bills, and bills
vetoed by state governors.

Figure 1-1: State Legislative Activity Regarding Noncitizens 2009 - 2014
In 2010, Arizona enacted SB1070, which criminalized the failure to carry proof of lawful
presence in the U.S. and obligated local police to check for proof of lawful presence during
criminal investigations. The Obama administration challenged Arizona's restrictive law in the
federal courts and in Arizona v. United States (2012) the Supreme Court found that some of
Arizona's policies were preempted by federal law, yet left in place a provision allowing state
police to investigate the immigration status of an individual during normal contact. This was
not a clear-cut victory for either proponents of restriction or accommodation. Institutional actors
may be awaiting the emergence of a new regime at the national level to provide a clear direction

14
on immigration policy, among other issues. And the election of Donald Trump, along with
unified government, may signal a clear direction at the national level.
Not surprisingly, in the absence of a clear message from a ruling regime, states have
enacted a hodgepodge of policies affecting immigrants. Arizona was not alone in passing an
immigration omnibus bill. Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah passed
similarly restrictive legislation. Yet, other states have enacted friendlier legislation. Twelve
states have extended in-state tuition costs to noncitizens in good standing who have graduated
from in-state high schools. Others have adopted both restrictions and accommodations, while
still others have been largely indifferent to immigrants. Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013) study
these state laws and find that the most consistent predictor of restrictive legislation is the growth
rate of that state's Latino population. This finding places the current diffusion of state
immigration policies within the historical pattern of localized opposition to a minority group,
alongside Jim Crow laws and lynching in the South, and segregated housing and lynching in
during the Great Migration. The Great Migration and the sudden growth of the Latino
population are similar in that they occurred in the absence of a clear national policy towards
those respective groups. The withdrawal of federal troops from the South after the election of
Rutherford B. Hayes left African Americans vulnerable to restrictive local and state policies and
extralegal violence. The inability or unwillingness of the national government to prevent the
migration of African Americans during and after World War I led to segregationist state and
local policies in the North. It was only when a clear regime established hegemony, the New
Deal coalition, that the national government put policies in place to protect African Americans.
Conversely, when the national government interned Japanese Americans in the 1940's, and
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deported Mexicans in the 1930's and 50's, it preempted what may have been some very ugly state
policies and extralegal actions. The inability of the national government to signal a clear
direction on immigration since 2001 had led to state policies, described above, that would have
been otherwise preempted by a clear national policy on immigration.
National government efforts to reform immigration policy in the 21st century have been
halting and incomplete, and this failure has been used by state government stake holders as their
motivation for action (Newton and Adams 2009, 408). Others suggest state governments have
been emboldened by their relatively unchallenged successes in passing immigration restrictions,
which has prompted additional state legislative activity (Boushey and Luedtke 2011, 391-92).
Still others note that decentralization born of federalism and divided government, “create[s]
openings for local actors” to make normative arguments about their need to get involved in
immigration policy (Wells 2004, 1308). What is clear is a spike in state government immigration
policymaking, beginning in the early 2000’s. Several state governors cited the failure of
immigration reform at the national level for prompting the need action within their own
respective states. Robert L. Savage (1985) examines the diffusion of child restraint and "lemonaid" laws and found that state policies could rapidly become national policies independent of
federal legislation. Immigration may now be an example of bottom-up federalism (Shipan and
Volden 2006; Gamkhar and Pickerill 2012), extending a local-to-state diffusion to state-tonational. The rapid diffusion certain types of laws may further indicate the existence of policy
entrepreneurs (Reich and Barth 2012); Kris Kobach, who coauthored some of the omnibus bills
discussed in Chapter Three, may be one such entrepreneur (Blitzer 2016).
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One can also view the shift in immigration policymaking to state governments as a
function of “new federalism,” defined by increased policymaking at the state level (Weissert,
Stenberg, and Cole 2009). Further evidence of this phenomenon is that Robert Jay Dilger (2000)
finds that state outlays increased at a faster rate than federal outlays during the 1990’s. Joe Soss,
Sanford F. Schram, Thomas P. Vartanian, and Erin O’Brien (2002) find that states adopted “get
tough” welfare rules from a combination of social and economic factors, not least of which was
the racial composition of families receiving welfare. Caroline Tolbert (2003) finds that states
rapidly adopted new governance policies, such as ballot initiatives, in the post-Reagan era. It
seems natural that immigration would follow these issue areas as policymaking increases at the
state level.
There is scholarship which suggests that states have become increasingly more likely to
engage in policy activism when the policy is social or moral in nature. Lori Riverstone-Newell
(2013; 2012) finds that local and state government will often enact legislation in defiance of
federal authority; if local and state governments expand “sanctuary” policies, that would
certainly qualify as an example of this phenomenon. Jeffrey A. Lax and Justin H. Phillips (2012;
2009) find that states have engaged in policy activism within a range of issues, including
immigration policy, in ways that emphasizes their moral and ethical aspects, usually at the urging
of their residents. Further, though immigration is often thought of in terms of economic causes
and consequences, the racial and ethnic makeup of America’s recent immigrant population raises
the possibility that racism may be at the heart of recent nativism. I will turn to that possibility in
the next section.
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The Influence of Partisanship, Economics, and Race/Ethnicity on Immigration Sentiment
There are many variables that factor into state policymaking. This research will also
consider partisanship as one of several factors influencing the rapid adoption of certain laws.
This raises the question of issue ownership: is it possible that one party “owns” certain types of
immigration legislation, while another “owns” other types of legislation? Gyung-Ho Jeong,
Gary J. Miller, Camilla Schofield, and Itai Sened (2011) argued that immigration was a crosscutting cleavage for the Republican Party in the 1980's. Business interests wanted inexpensive
labor, but social conservatives are opposed to an influx of non-European immigrants.
Additionally, studying Congressional immigration legislation at the national level, Jeong et al.
(2011) found that by 2006 immigration was a social, rather than economic, issue. "Republicans
took a position favored by social conservatives - less admission - while Democrats took the
position favored by civil rights and ethnic groups - more admission" (522). Consequently, it
could be argued that a policy of restriction is “owned” by the Republican Party, while a policy of
accommodation is “owned” by the Democrats.
As with any government policy, there are winners and losers from the flow of immigrants
into and out of the U.S. Jack Citrin, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste, and Cara Wong
(1997) found a strong relationship between negative sentiment towards immigrants and
pessimism regarding the nation’s economy. Additionally, Ellen Barkan (2003) found that
restrictionist sentiment paralleled negative expectations regarding California’s economy through
the 1980’s and 90’s. Ted Brader, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay (2008) found that
news stories concerning the economic consequences of illegal immigration are more likely to
boost anxiety among whites when those stories contain images of Latinos, Latino surnames, or
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other ethnic cues. This anxiety, “triggered opposition to immigration and multilingual laws…
and led people to send anti-immigration messages to Congress” (975). Abrajano and Hajnal
(2015) find that the size of the Latino population in a state influences whites’ attitudes on a
whole range of issues that includes immigration, but also welfare, healthcare, and criminal
justice. Moreover, states with larger Latino populations tend to spend less on education, more on
corrections, and have more regressive taxation (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015).
According to the 2010 census, the majority of America’s foreign-born were either
ethnically Hispanic/Latino or racially Asian/Pacific-Islander. A racial threat hypothesis holds
that larger minority constituencies will make white constituents feel threatened by economic,
political, and cultural competition, and consequently hold more negative views toward minorities
(Brief et al. 2005; Glaser 1994; Rudolph and Popp 2010), support more restrictive minority
policies (Huddy and Sears 1995), and support candidates who will provide worse representation
of minority interests (Giles and Buckner 1993; Wright 1977). Recent research finds support for a
racial/ethnic threat hypothesis. Several studies find that larger black populations are associated
with more negative racial attitudes (Avery and Fine 2012a; Brief et al 2005; Taylor 1998) and
less interracial trust (Rudolph and Popp 2010) among whites. Other research at the local level
finds that larger and growing Latino populations are associated with greater support for
restrictive immigration policy among whites (e.g., Ha 2010; Hopkins 2010). Still other research
finds that states are more likely to adopt restrictive immigration policies when the Latino
population is growing (Marquez and Schraufnagel 2013). For example, whites’ attitudes toward
immigration appear to be a product of individuals’ beliefs about American identify (Citrin,
Reingold, and Green 1990; Wong 2010). Research finds that the belief that immigrants violate
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civic norms (Schildkraut 2011) and pose cultural threats (Branton et al. 2011; Schildkraut 2005),
including language-related threats (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Newman, Hartman, and Taber
2012), are strong predictors of whites’ negative attitudes toward immigration. Other research
finds that attitudes toward Latinos specifically influence whites’ views on immigration
(Hartman, Newman, and Bell 2013; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013), a relationship that
appears to be strongest when accompanied by media coverage emphasizing potential threats of
immigration (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Branton et al. 2011; Gadarian and Albertson
2013). Thus, a great deal of research suggests that whites’ attitudes toward immigration are in
part a product of perceived threats immigrants may pose to American identity, and civic and
cultural norms, and that these threats are strongly linked to perceptions of Latinos specifically.
As a result, a racial threat hypothesis will be considered in later chapters.
Support for restrictions or accommodations on noncitizens depends on several factors.
Some research finds that whites living in neighborhoods with larger Latino populations support
more restrictive immigration policy (Ha 2010), while other research finds that this relationship is
limited to areas with larger illegal immigrant populations (Hood and Morris 1998). Recent
research emphasizes the importance of considering change in immigrant and Latino populations
and the conditional effects of geographic context when considering whites’ attitudes toward
immigration. For example, Hopkins (2010) finds that living in areas with growing immigrant
populations leads to more restrictive views about immigration, but only when immigration is
nationally salient. Other research finds that increases in the size of the Latino population and the
level of residential segregation results in more negative attitudes toward immigrants and greater
support for making English the official language (Rocha and Espino 2009). Similarly, Newman
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(2013) finds that an influx of Latinos into counties leads to greater perceptions of threat among
whites and less support for immigration, but only in counties that had initially small Latino
populations. In counties with initially large Latino populations, an increase in the number of
Latinos leads to less threat and greater support for immigration among whites. Thus, while
larger Latino populations are generally associated with greater opposition to immigration, this
relationship appears to depend on a number of contexts including legal vs. illegal status, as well
as national and local ethnic or immigrant contexts.
State entry into immigration policy has important implications for American federalism.
It is well-established that race and ethnicity are factors shaping a variety of state policies, and,
because of civil rights implications, they shape relations between states and the national
government (Hero 1998). State immigration policy changes inevitably falls into the realm of
civil rights policies, given the demographics of arrivals since 1965. Again, over half of all
foreign-born persons in the US are from Latin American nations and these individuals,
documented and undocumented, have experienced varying degrees of discrimination during the
20th century (Gibson 1990). Any new policies concerning immigration, at the state level, will
disproportionately affect Hispanics, with latent implications for ethnic relations, civil rights
abuse, and federalism. It has also been argued, “state governments have consistently and
categorically been found to lack legal competence in the [immigration policy] arena” (Spiro
1995, 91).
Determining if states are acting in ways that disadvantage a particular ethnicity will shed
light on potential civil rights abuses, but also make clear any challenge to national government
autonomy in a policy arena long recognized as the responsibility of the federal government.
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Moreover, the spurt in state immigration policymaking has implications for state representation
and influence in the nation’s capital. According to the Center for Immigration Studies, the
immigrant population of the United States grew at twice the rate as the native-born population
during the last decennial census period. Any state policies that restrict, or encourage,
immigration patterns may influence the balance of policy-making authority in the U.S. federal
system.
Outline

This dissertation will focus on the legislation enacted by states regarding noncitizens
during the period from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2014. First, though, I will set the stage
for such a study by analyzing the pattern of migration during the 2000 to 2010 period. As stated
above, there may be a historical corollary between the recent period of state policy activity
concerning noncitizens and the state and local policies that northern states and cities enacted
during the Great Migration. Thus, Chapter Two will uncover how Asians and Latinos migrated
to the American states from 2000 to 2010. In general, both Asians and Latinos migrated away
from states that had higher existing Asian and Latino populations, respectively. The strongest
predictor of Asian population growth is total population growth. In other words, Asians tended
to follow the overall trends concerning state population growth. Conversely, Latinos were drawn
to rural states, and to southern ones. I then uncover what “South” means in this context, and find
that Latinos were drawn to states where African Americans made up a larger portion of the state
population, in addition to the previously uncovered variables.
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An underlying assumption in Chapters Three, Four, and Five is that local conditions often
drive state policies (Peterson 1995). This assumption seems to have followed state entry into
immigration policymaking. Put another way, immigration policies are more likely driven by
local conditions, such as the growth of certain populations, than action or inaction at the national
level. In Chapter Three I examine the restrictions on noncitizens enacted by the states. These
restrictions consist of instructions to lower government, instructions to firms and individuals, and
omnibus bills similar to Arizona’s SB1070. I find that an increase in the count of restrictions
passed by the states is directly associated with the growth of the state’s foreign-born population,
the growth of the state’s Latino population, and the percent of the state’s population with a
college degree. I further find that an increase in the count of restrictions passed by the states is
inversely associated with the state’s GDP per capita and Berry’s citizen ideology score (where a
lower score indicates a more conservative state population). The growth of a state’s Asian
population is not a statistically significant variable in this model.
In Chapter Four I examine the accommodations for noncitizens enacted by the states.
These again fell into three broad categories: instructions to lower governmental entities to
include noncitizens in some program or license class, measures to prevent human trafficking and
protect noncitizens from traffickers, state versions of the DREAM Act (which failed at the
national level), and laws opposing the federal REAL ID program. I find that the count of
accommodations enacted by the state are directly associated with the state’s size of its existing
foreign-born, Asian, and Latino populations, respectively. I also find the count of
accommodations enacted is directly associated with Berry’s citizen ideology score. Conversely,
the count of accommodations enacted by each state is inversely associated with the state’s per
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capita GDP spending. Other variables behaved differently depending on which key explanatory
variable was used: the state’s foreign-born population, the state’s Asian population, and the
state’s Latino population.
In Chapter Five I return to the score developed by Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013). I
update and revise the score, and test it using an expanded data set. Unfortunately, the most
important finding in Márquez and Schraufnagel, that the growth rate of a state’s Latino
population is associated with greater restriction by the states, does not hold up with the expanded
dataset. I find that the states changed their behavior during the 2009 to 2014 period. From 2009
to 2011, the majority of laws enacted were restrictions. However, from 2012 to 2014 the
majority of laws enacted were accommodations; this trend continues when 2014 is added to the
dataset. I correct for this by splitting the dataset into two periods and assigning a score for each.
I find that many of Márquez and Schraufnagel’s findings hold up for the 2009 to 2011 period:
the growth rate of the foreign-born and Latino populations are associated with restriction, while
the size of the existing foreign-born, Asian, and Latino populations are associated with
accommodation, respectively.
Chapter Six summarizes the findings so far, providing a context and linking conclusions.
I also turn to some future areas of research not covered in previous chapters. Chapter Six
concludes with an epilogue that examines the impact of the 2016 presidential elections. I employ
the sentiment score along with other variables to predict a Trump victory at the state level. I find
that state GDP is associated with Trump’s success in the states. Consistent with my theory, I
find that conservative and rural states tended to support Trump. Likewise, the lower the state’s
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sentiment towards noncitizens, the higher Trump’s odds were of winning that state. Thus,
immigration played a key role as a wedge issue in the 2016 presidential campaign.

CHAPTER TWO: WHAT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS PRECEDED STATE LEGISLATIVE
ACTION TOWARDS NONCITIZENS?
The chapter attempts to identify relationships that exist between the flow of racial and
ethnic groups into an American state and the conditions that prevail in that state. More
specifically, the research uncovers changes in immigration patterns during the last decennial
census period, 2000 to 2010 and tests competing explanations for changes in the ethnic, racial,
and noncitizen populations in the American states. I will pay particular attention to new trends
and/or sudden changes in established migration patterns. The literature suggests several broad
concerns which may play a role in migration patterns: demographics, economics, geography, and
politics. I will attempt to measure these concerns and explore how they influence the flow of
certain populations into each American state. This question is important because a changing
pattern of migration may upset existing institutional arrangements at the state level, and lead to
new state policies that touch upon race and ethnicity. I will test for any such connection in the
next chapters. In this chapter, I will focus on determining if some state noncitizen populations
are growing in a nonrandom fashion.
Up until now, much of the explanation for the migration of Latinos throughout the
American states could be explained by the nature of the agricultural industry (Katz et al. 2007;
Huang 2006). Demand for labor in agriculture has always been seasonal, and many crops are
hand-picked, necessitating large numbers of workers. This has led to a demand for seasonal
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labor, usually satisfied by migrants from Mexico and other parts of Latin America. From 1942
to 1964, the U.S. government arranged for millions of workers from Mexico, called braceros, to
work seasonally in agriculture (Snodgrass 2011). Yet, after the end of the bracero program and
the lifting of immigration restrictions in 1965, recent research finds that Latino immigrants are
more inclined to settle permanently in the United States. Patricia Fernández-Kelly and Douglas
S. Massey (2007) argue that this is because over time it is has become progressively more
difficult to move back and forth across the border with Mexico. The era of seasonal migration is
largely over, and permanent resettlement has become the new norm. The permanent settlement
of noncitizens in a state, who were traditionally thought of as temporary workers, will
undoubtedly alter the policies of that state, and I will address these policies in later chapters.
In this chapter, I attempt to uncover what might be drawing noncitizens to particular
states. This issue has not been covered very thoroughly and firm answers remain elusive. Using
census data from 2000 to 2010, I will attempt to test established hypotheses concerning the
growth of the Latino and Asian population in the 50 states. I initially considered using each
state’s foreign-born population as a dependent variable, but decide against it for several reasons.
First, I find that that there is a strong correlation between the state Latino growth rate and the
state foreign-born growth rate (r = .85). Hence, Latino population growth accounted for most of
the foreign-born growth that occurred in the states. Second, although I am studying legislation
concerning immigration, there is no way to tell if a person is an immigrant through casual
contact, regardless of that person’s race or ethnicity. Therefore, I am focusing on the “otherness”
presented by Latino and Asian populations. Many people will simply assume that a Latino or an
Asian is an immigrant, and this may lead to the formation of attitudes regarding immigration in
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general. Third, Latinos and Asians, whether foreign-born or not, represent entirely different
sorts of workforces. Using the Public Use Microdata Sample from the Census Bureau, Anna B.
Madamba and Gordon F. De Jong (1997) determined that Asian immigrants between the ages of
25 and 64 have nearly the same level of education as non-Hispanic whites. Conversely, Emilio
A. Parrado (2012) found that Latino immigrants have a lower level of education on average than
non-Hispanic whites, and that Latinos make up nearly two-thirds of the U.S. workforce that lacks
a high school diploma. Based on these findings, I posit that the factors that cause an influx of
one group into a state may not cause an influx of another. Consequently, it is necessary to use
separate models to explain the movements of two distinct populations.
My data source for state populations is the U.S. Census. The year 1980 was the first
decennial Census which created a separate classification for Hispanic/Latino. In the 1970
Census and before, Latinos were simply coded as “white” unless they appeared to be American
Indian by the census taker. Latin America is obviously very diverse, with millions of people of
European, indigenous, African, Japanese, Chinese, and mixed ancestry. Further, Latin America
also encompasses many nationalities, each with a distinct identity. However, in this study I will
combine Latinos and treat them like one ethnicity, just as the Census does. In doing so, I follow
the Pew Hispanic Center, and also Michael Lewis-Beck, William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth,
and Herbert F. Weisberg (2008) who find evidence of group identity among Hispanics (see also
Barreto 2010). Doing so will allow me to focus on the “otherness” presented by Latinos.
Further, an underlying assumption of Chapters Three, Four, and Five is that people might adopt
nativist sentiments upon the sudden growth of Asian and/or Latino populations without first
determining whether those Asians and/or Latinos were actually born outside the U.S. Because of
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this, I am just as interested in Latinos who were born in the U.S. as I am in Latinos born in the
various nations of Latin America, as they may provoke the same reaction.
Likewise, the Census Bureau has altered classifications of Asians over the decades.
Sometimes Asians have been grouped by region, sometimes by ethnicity, and at other times by
nationality. For this project, all Asian nationalities (Japanese, Chinese, Pakistani, etc.) have been
classified as Asian. I recognize that there are vast cultural and ethnic differences between a
Chinese person and, say, a Bangladeshi. Language, history, religion, and a constellation of other
important traits separate two such people. But the manner in which census data was collected
prohibits me from separating all Asian nationalities into mutually exclusive categories. The
heart of the issue is that all Asians are considered non-white, and this results in the possibility of
racial discrimination which I will explore in later chapters. As above, I am choosing to focus on
the “otherness” presented by all Asians living in a country with a majority white, European
ancestry. Likewise, I am just as interested in the migration of Asians who were born in the U.S.
as I am in Asians arriving from China, India, and so forth.

GROWTH RATE
TOTAL
ASIAN
LATINO

Table 2-1: Population Growth
MEAN
STD. DEV.
MIN
9.86
7.26
-0.55 (MI)
55.47
20.09
4.21 (HI)
73.46
30.12
19.16 (NY)

MAX
35.15 (NV)
116.51 (NV)
147.89 (SC)

Table 2-1 presents descriptive statistics regarding the total population growth for each
state, the state Latino population growth rate, and the state Asian population growth rate,
respectively, during the decade 2000-2010. Using the data from the 2000 and 2010 censuses, I
calculate the total, Asian, and Latino population growth over that decade. I have also dropped
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the “Other” category that appeared in the 1980 and 2000 Censuses, and the “Two or More”
category that appeared in the 2000 Census. Note in Table 2.1, the mean growth rate for both
Asian and Latino populations exceed the mean for the total population. Also, the national Latino
population grew at a faster rate than the Asian population. Looking at the data broken down by
states, it should be noted that the population growth of both Asians and Latinos in the first
decade of the Twenty-First Century were positive for all states including Michigan, which was
the only state to have a negative overall growth rate during the time period studied. This is no
doubt due to the collapse of the automobile industry in that state, as automobile manufacturing
moved to other states, or Mexico and Canada.
Figure 2-1 on the next page displays the Asian population growth rate for each state, and
Figure 2-2 displays the Latino population growth rate for each state. In these figures, the states
are ordered from highest percentage growth to lowest. Notably, the order of states is different in
the two figures, meaning that the state Asian population grew in a different manner from the
state Latino population. Further, three of the top ten destinations for Asians were southern
states; that is, states that joined the Confederacy at the time of the Civil War. As for Latinos, six
of the top ten states were southern states. This may represent a break from previous patterns of
migration as described above. Overall, the growth of the Asian population appears to be more
widely dispersed than the growth of the Latino population. Asian population growth occurs in
the southern states, western states, the northeast, the Midwest, and so on.
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Figure 1-1: Asian Population Growth Rate by State
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Demographic Explanations

One explanation for immigration flow suggests that the existing state population
influences immigration patterns. Daniel J. Hopkins (2010) has described a mechanism called
“chain migration” that may be responsible for an increase in many immigrant communities.
Chain migration occurs when a migrant relocates to an area, finds work, and informs the people
“back home” that work can be found. Alternatively, the migrant may call his spouse, children,
and other relatives to join him when he is financially secure. Indeed, Karen A. WoodrowLafield, Xiaohe Xu, Thomas Kersen, and Bunnak Poch (2004) found that the majority of lawful
immigrants entering the U.S. since the 1980’s did so on family-sponsored visas, rather than
employment visas. Whatever the specific mechanism, the result of chain migration is that the
numbers from a specific race or ethnic group in a geographic area increase at a rate faster than
simple population reproduction dynamics would suggest.
Similar to the concept of chain migration, there is literature showing that immigrants are
drawn to America’s traditional ports of entry: New York, California, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and
New Jersey (Anrig and Wang 2006). There are some very well-known facts about these states
which support a port of entry thesis. New York’s Ellis Island is famous for its history as the
gateway for millions of immigrants in the pre-World War I period. Likewise, California has
historically been an entry point for both Asian and Mexican migrants to the United States. Texas
has long been a crossroads for population shifts between Northern Mexico and the Southwestern
United States; terms like “Tejano,” “Tex-Mex,” and “Texican” are widely used to describe the
blending of American and Mexican culture in that region. Florida’s proximity to the Caribbean,
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particularly Cuba, has made Miami sort of a southern Ellis Island. Illinois’ Chicago region, like
New York City, has attracted immigrants since the Nineteenth Century. New Jersey has
benefitted from proximity to New York City; in particular, New Jersey has been the home of a
large Italian population and foreign-born Italians still make up a sizeable proportion of the state’s
population.
Hypothesis H1 will test the chain migration thesis that Latinos and Asians are drawn to
areas that already have large Latino and Asian populations, respectively. I considered using a
simple dummy variable to represent the six traditional gateway states, but a ratio variable is
better than a dummy variable. Specifically, the key explanatory variable is operationalized for
Model A as the number of state residents who are Asian in 2000 as reported by the Census
Bureau. For Model B I use the number of each state’s Latino population that same year. If the
chain migration thesis is meritorious then larger existing state populations should associate with
an increase in the rate of growth in those populations. This leads to my first two hypotheses:
H1A: The 2000 state Asian population is directly associated with the state Asian growth
rate from 2000 to 2010.
H1B: The 2000 state Latino population is directly associated with the state Latino growth
rate from 2000 to 2010.
Economic Explanations

No one relocates from one area to another without good reason. An underlying
assumption of my theory of migration is that anyone who migrates to a state is looking to benefit
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themselves economically, and that the best way to increase one’s income is to find a job. There
is research suggesting that the availability of jobs is a prime motivator for immigration flows
(Ryo 2013), and such an assumption is compatible with the above chain migration explanation.
After all, if one migrant finds work, the chain migration explanation assumes that he will call a
relative or friend and tell them work can be found. It is important to note that a count of payrolls
may not reflect the total noncitizen workforce. Many immigrants, especially unauthorized
noncitizens, find off-payroll work that is not captured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Likewise, it is very difficult to find farm payrolls because the BLS only provides non-farm
payrolls. Consequently, a better measure of the availability of work for persons who do or do
not have a legal right to work in this country is the overall condition of a state’s economy. My
reasoning is that even if workers are paid in cash, and their earnings are not recorded, they will
then spend that cash in ways that affect the state’s economy. Purchasing food, gasoline, paying
rent, and even entertainment expenses are captured by a state’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Because my assumption is that Asian and Latino migrants are generally looking for work,
the third set of hypotheses will test whether the growth of the state economy is associated with
the population growth rate for each group. The Bureau of Economic Analysis tracks the GDP
growth for each state. 1 I will regress the Asian and Latino population growth rates for each state
0F

onto the state GDP growth rate between July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2010. This range covers
periods of both economic growth and contraction in most American states, which makes it

U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by State,”
https://www.bea.gov/regional/downloadzip.cfm (accessed 6-1-2016).
1
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somewhat of a blunt instrument. Nonetheless there are some intuitive values, such as that
Michigan has a much lower growth rate than North Dakota, and so forth.
H4A: The GDP growth rate of each state is directly associated with the growth rate of the
Asian population for each state.
H4B: The GDP growth rate of each state is directly associated with the growth rate of the
Latino population for each state.
Political Explanations

My second set of hypotheses will test whether immigrants are drawn to blue states, or
states where the Democratic Party is more popular. Scholars have found that the Democrats
have adopted an accommodating approach to immigration, while Republicans (GOP) have
adopted a more restricting approach (Reich and Barth 2012, Jeong et al. 2010), as evidenced by
the nomination of an immigration hawk, Donald J. Trump, as the GOP standard-bearer in 2016.
To test this, I will use a variable that captures the extent to which Democrats control a state’s
government. This variable was developed by Marquez and Schraufnagel (2013) and it scores the
states based on which party controls the governorship, which controls the upper chamber of the
state legislature, and which controlled the lower chamber of the state legislature in 2010.
H2A: The Asian population growth rate is directly associated with the Democratic Party’s
control of a state’s government.
H2B: The Latino population growth rate is directly associated with Democratic Party’s
control of a state’s government.
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In 2015, the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) issued a report 2 based on U.S. Census
1F

data asserting that half of immigrant households receive some type of welfare. This report was
picked up by USA Today (Gomez 2015) and other news outlets. The next set of hypothesis will
test whether there is a “race to the top” effect among Asian and Latino migrants; that is, whether
noncitizens are drawn to states with higher per capita welfare spending, based on 2010 data.
H5A: The Asian population growth rate is directly associated with the state per capita
welfare spending.
H5B: The Latino population growth rate is directly associated with the state per capita
welfare spending.
Geographic Explanations

The southern United States has experienced an economic renaissance at the end of the
20th century and in the first decade of the 21st Century. Indeed, its warmer climate, lower taxes,
and lower cost of living has attracted people since the invention of air conditioning (need
citation). Larry L. Hunt, Matthew O. Hunt, and William W. Falk (2008) discovered that the late
twentieth century saw a flow of migrants into the South, including many new migrants (that is,
migrants who had not been born in the South). This pattern reverses the one seen in the early
twentieth century, where millions of African Americans moved to Northern cities during the
Great Migration. Further, Paula D. McClain, Niambi M. Carter, Victoria M DeFrancesco Soto,
Monique L. Lyle, Jeffrey D. Grynaviski, Shayla C. Nunnally, Thonas J. Scotto, J. Alan

2

http://cis.org/Welfare-Use-Legal-Illegal-Immigrant-Households (accessed 12-18-2016)
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Kendrick, Gerald F. Lackey, and Kendra Davenport Cotton (2006) found that large numbers of
Asians and Latinos were migrating to southern cities during the same time period. There is also
evidence that this new pattern altered the traditional white-black dynamic in some cities.
Hypothesis set H6 will apply this theory statewide, because the states, not municipalities, are my
unit of analysis throughout this dissertation. I will test whether Asians and Latinos were drawn
to the South during the last Census period. Both studies speculated that states like North
Carolina and Georgia were emerging to join Texas and Florida as gateway states. I will use a
dummy variable to stand in for the eleven states of the former Confederacy.
H6A: The state Asian population growth rate is directly associated with southern states.
H6B: The state Latino population growth rate is directly associated with southern states.
Hypothesis set H6 will test the theory that Asians and Latinos are drawn to geographic
areas with large populations, as opposed to sparsely-populated rural areas. Cities will draw more
migrants for several reasons. First, as stated above, many migrants are following the movement
of previous migrants, such as family members. Where there are more people, there are
inherently more migrants. Further, geographic areas that have large populations will have more
employment opportunities. Cities offer a concentration of businesses needing workers and
people needing goods and services. I will be using the Iowa Community Indicators Program
measure 3 of the percentage of each state’s population that lives in cities, which is drawn from
2F

U.S. Census Bureau data. In contrast to the other hypotheses, I predict that the Asian and Latino
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populations will move in opposite directions, with Asians drawn to the cities, and Latinos drawn
to more rural states that offer employment opportunities in agriculture.
H7A: The state Asian population growth rate is directly associated with the urbanization
rate of the state.
H7B: The state Latino population growth rate is inversely associated with the
urbanization rate of the state.
Results and Analysis

This exploratory research will utilize a multivariate, quasi-experimental design to test two
models using several hypotheses suggested by existing literature. Put another way, I will test the
influence of several variables on a nonrandom group (the American states). My research
question is, what factors cause Asian and Latino populations to grow in a state? I recognize that
some factors may be significant for one population but not significant for the other. As Figures
2-1 and 2-2 show, the Asian and Latino populations grew at different rates in different states.
Therefore, Model A will have the Asian population growth rate as its dependent variable, and
Model B will have the Latino population growth rate as the dependent variable. A primary
control variable will be the total population growth for each state. The results for Model A are
listed in Table 2-2, the results for Model B are listed in Table 2-3. The expected direction is also
provided. Because this data is cross-sectional, there is a substantial risk of heteroskedasticity
(Gujarati 2003, 401). However, when I test for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan and
Cook-Weisberg tests, with the null hypothesis that the variance is constant, I find that I cannot
reject null for either Model A or Model B. Therefore, I do not report robust standard errors. I do
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not anticipate an autocorrelation problem because I am not using time series data. I also test for
multicollinearity. The mean Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for Model A is 1.38, and none of
the variables exceed 10. The mean VIF for Model B is also 1.38, and none of the variables
exceed 10. The results are reported in Tables 2-2 and 2-3 below.
Table 2-2: State Asian Population Growth
Expected Sign

Chain Migration
2000 Asian population

Model A Coefficient (s.e.)

+

-6.05-6 (4.91-6)

Economic Explanations
2000-10 GDP growth rate
Per capita welfare

+
+

-2.16 (2.46)
-.003 (.007)

Political Explanations
Democratic control

+

-1.36 (6.36)

Geographic Explanations
South
Urban percentage

+
+

2.69 (5.97)
-.25 (.20)

Total population growth rate

1.63 (.45)***

Constant
F statistic (7, 42)
Adjusted R2
n

73.65 (22.83)**
3.94**
.29
50
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05

Model A produced some surprising results. None of the key explanatory variables were
statistically significant at p < .10, and some tests produce results in the wrong direction. The
chain migration hypothesis not only fails, but the coefficient moves in the wrong direction. The
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control variable, state total population growth, is the best explanation of Asian population
growth; that is, each state’s Asian population grew along with its total population. Was there
some antecedent variable which caused the growth of both the total population and the Asian
population? Certainly, but the issue is whether this variable caused the growth of one population
but not the other. Given the strong correlation between total population growth and Asian
population growth, it is likely that whatever factors caused a state’s total population to grow are
true of Asian population growth.

Moreover, five of the explanatory variables that were expected to be directly associated
with the dependent variable are instead inversely associated with it. Only per capita welfare
spending moved in the direction predicted by theory, though the relationship is not statistically
significant. Consequently, chain migration does not explain the growth of the Asian population,
nor does Democratic control of government, nor GDP growth, nor per capita welfare spending,
nor southerness, nor urbanization. The result of Model A is that, even when several variables are
considered, the Asian population of the American states grew in much the same manner as the
total population. A one percent increase in the total state population is associated with just over
a one-and-a-half percent increase in the state’s Asian population, on average, all else being
equal.
Table 2-3: State Latino Population Growth
Chain Migration
2000 Latino population

Expected Sign
+
(Continued on following page)

Model B Coefficient (s.e.)
-5.11-6** (1.73-6)
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Table 2-3 (continued)
Economic Explanations
2000-10 GDP growth rate
Per capita welfare

Expected Sign

Model B Coefficient (s.e.)

+
+

-3.17 (2.92)
-.01 (.01)

Political Explanations
Democratic control

+

2.65 (7.56)

Geographic Explanations
South
Urban percentage

+
-

31 (7.14) ***
-.76 (.24) **

Total population growth rate

.71 (.53)

Constant
F statistic (7, 42)
Adjusted R2
n

145.08 (27.22) ***
9.82**
.55
50
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05

Model B produces different findings. In contrast to the Asian population, the Latino
population of the American states grew in a demonstrably nonrandom fashion. According to
these data, Latinos actually avoided regions that contained a large pre-existing Latino population.
The chain migration hypothesis is disqualified as a key explanation of the growth of the Latino
population at the state level. It is likely that chain migration explained most Latino population
growth in the past, but that does not appear to be the case any longer. This raises the possibility
that a region can only support a limited number of persons with a certain education level at one
time. Put another way, it appears that the Latino population in the states that already have large
Latino populations, like New Mexico and California, have stabilized. Hence, the areas of rapid
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Latino population growth are in states like South Carolina, Alabama, and Tennessee, which may
be emerging as gateway states similar to Florida and Texas (see Figure 2-2 above).
What Does South Mean?

Latinos appear to be drawn to the South, confirming the observations of McClain et al.
(2006). This begs the question: what exactly is being measured by a dummy variable that
includes the states that joined the Confederacy over a century and a half ago? I would argue that
there is mishmash of variables taking on unique values in those states. For example, one cannot
ignore the fact that slavery was historically concentrated in the South, though not confined there.
However, it is difficult to conceive of a direct connection between slavery in the antebellum
period and Latino migration in the twenty-first century. But, there may be antecedent
consideration at work, such as the need for low-skilled labor combined with a cultural
willingness to exploit low-skilled workers. I will attempt to measure these factors using labor
unions as a barometer of the ability, or inability, of employers to exploit labor. My assumption is
that states which allow for closed shops are more friendly to labor, whereas right-to-work states
(which have open shops) are less friendly. According to the National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation, every former Confederate state had adopted some form of right-to-work by
1960; except for Oklahoma and Louisiana, which adopted right-to-work at later dates. 4 This fact
3F
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is consistent with regarding contention that there is a general willingness of southern states to
exploit labor.
Tied to the story above is the fact that the southern states all have a sizeable African
American population. From colonial times, through the antebellum era, and through the era of
sharecropping and Jim Crow, African Americans have historically been the victims of
exploitation of varying kinds, and this has been especially true in southern states. Paul Attewell,
David Lavin, Thurston Domina, and Tania Levey (2004) found that size of the black middle
class had increased over a thousand percent between the beginning of the twentieth century and
beginning of the twenty-first. The authors’ contention that part of this increase is due to
increased immigration from Africa and the Caribbean, notwithstanding, it is possible that, as
African Americans move up the occupational and income hierarchy, there is an opportunity on
the bottom rungs for Latinos. That is, as African Americans ascend to the middle class, there are
fewer African Americans to fill lower class positions in agriculture, construction, grounds
keeping, and cleaning services. If my initial contention that migration is largely driven by
income is true, then Latinos will be drawn to the South to fill positions formerly filled by African
Americans. A more pessimistic view, though, is that as large numbers of African Americans are
incarcerated and put out of the workforce, they will be replaced by working class Latinos.
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, over two million people were incarcerated
nationwide at the beginning of the twentieth century. 5 Dorothy E. Roberts (2004) found that
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2002. This circumstance shrinks the available labor pool and possibly creates an opening for
Latinos, although Roberts also found that over 200,000 Hispanic men had been incarcerated for
more than a year nationwide by the end of 2002.
The increased immigration of Latinos into areas with preexisting African American
populations may have unintended consequences. In a nuanced study, Robert M. Adelman,
Cameron Lippard, Charles Jaret, and Lesley Williams Reid (2005) found that increased
immigration is associated with increased earnings for African Americans in in the middle of the
income and occupational hierarchy, but that increased immigration is also associated with
decreased earnings for African Americans at the bottom of the hierarchy. These findings imply
that Latinos migrating to the South may be crowding out some African Americans, rather than
taking their place. Consider this: between 2000 and 2010, the African American population of
the U.S. grew by just over 12 percent. In the same span of time, the Hispanic/Latino population
grew by over 40 percent. However, though it is important to note these two competing
theoretical arguments, distinguishing between replacement and displacement is beyond the scope
of this paper.
Returning to my earlier assumption that migrants are driven by a desire for income, I will
now turn to the types of occupations that are more available in the South than in other regions. A
noticeable feature of the South is that it is warmer than the rest of the continental United States.
Consequently, some avenues of employment that are seasonal in the North are available yearround in the South. For example, much construction comes to halt in the northern U.S. when
winter hits, but not in the South. Additionally, many jobs in construction do not require an
education or special certification. Combined with an absence of strong labor unions to prevent
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access to the workplace, migrants may find greater opportunities for employment in construction
in southern states than in northern ones. Likewise, warmer climates mean greater need for
grounds keeping services year-round, whereas in the North lawns and golf courses are covered in
snow and ice for several months.
Further, the farms of the southern U.S. produce different crops than northern farms.
Wheat and corn can be picked by combine harvesters, which means that a single, trained
operator can harvest thousands of square acres. By contrast, the crops that are common in
warmer states tend to be labor intensive ones that involve a laborer individually picking each
one. Oranges, grapes, lettuce, cauliflower, peaches, watermelon, most nuts, and several other
crops require many workers to harvest. These workers do not necessarily need to be educated, or
even English-speaking. Thus, recent migrants from Latin America, documented or otherwise,
may be able to find work on farms growing these crops. Also, many of these crops require
warmer climates. Thus, I will use the average temperature of each state to measure some of the
factors discussed above. I have used the North American Land Data Assimilation System to find
each state’s average daily temperature, except for Hawaii and Alaska, where I used the average
daily temperatures of Anchorage and Honolulu, respectively. 6
5F

None of these factors are exclusive to the South. There are right-to-work laws in the
middle and western states. Likewise, raisins and oranges are grown in California as well as in
the South. The South does not have a monopoly on pro-business legislation, either. My
reasoning is that these factors cluster in the southern states and interact with one another in a
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manner that drew Latinos to these states in the time period under study, 2000 to 2010. There are
other characteristics that tend to occur more frequently in the South as well: higher rates of
church attendance, social conservatism, support for gun rights, preference for small government,
lower cost of living, and so forth. However, I can think of no underlying theory which predicts
that, say, a higher rate of church attendance would drive Latinos to certain states. The same
holds for social conservatism, support for gun rights, and a preference for small government. It
is possible that some migration occurs because of a difference in the cost of living between the
states. However, cost of living seems more likely an explanation for the migration of elderly
people on a fixed income, rather than for the migration of Latinos searching for employment.
There are two variables that were used in Model B which will also be used as explanatory
variables in Model C below: urbanization rate and Latino population in 2000. The southern
states tend to be less urban than northern ones like New York and Illinois; they are also less
urban than western states like Utah and Nevada. Although this variable was not statistically
significant in Model B, changing the variables model specification may improve the explanatory
power of these theoretically important considerations. The state Latino population was
significant in Model B, though it moved in the direction opposite of what had been predicted. It
would be a shame to lose the explanatory power of that variable on the migration of Latinos
during the period under study, so I retain that variable in Model C, with the expected direction of
association now expected to be negative rather than positive. Finally, in Model C, the total state
population growth will be retained as a control variable.
Moving to some of these new explanations I first offer the following two hypotheses:
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H8C: There is an inverse association between the urbanization rate of a state and the
growth rate of the Latino population for each state.
H9C: There is an inverse association between a state’s 2000 Latino population and the
state Latino population growth rate from 2000 to 2010.
Hypothesis H10C will test whether the strength of labor unions in a state have some effect
on the migration of Latinos into that state. My theory assumes that migrants, both internal and
external, are looking for work, and unions can restrict access to a workplace. Specifically, I
expect a negative association between the unionization rate and the growth rates of the Latino
population. I considered using a simple dummy variable for states that have enacted Right to
Work, but I regard a ratio variable as inherently more accurate than a dummy variable.
H10C: There is an inverse association between the unionization rate of a state and the
growth rate of the Latino population for that state from 2000 to 2010.
Hypothesis H11C will test whether Latinos migrated to states with large African American
populations. As stated above, my reasoning is that, as African Americans move up the wage
ladder, this leaves an opening at the bottom rungs for Latinos. I have calculated the African
American percentage of each state’s population in 2000, the beginning of the period under study
for this chapter. Ideally, I would use the percentage of each state’s black middle-class, but the
Census Bureau does not aggregate data in this fashion, and the measure could be wrought with
error because one might imagine any of several reasons why the African-American middle class
might be larger in one state than another that has nothing to do with the sort of mobility thesis
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that I am proposing. Hence, I am left with a rather blunt estimation technique, but one that
nonetheless provides for a straightforward test and interpretation.
H11C: There is a direct association between the African American percentage of a state’s
population in 2000 and the growth rate of the Latino population for that state from 2000 to
2010.
Hypothesis H12C will test whether Latinos were drawn to warmer states in the last decade.
As noted above, my hunch is that warmer weather means year-round employment in construction
and grounds keeping. I am also using this variable to measure the presence of labor-intensive
crops like grapes, oranges, lettuce, certain peppers, and so forth. I realize that warm weather is
an imperfect measure of the need for farm labor. Ideally, I would have created a list of all handpicked crops, and then calculated the tonnage produced by each state. Alternatively, I tried
calculating how many acres were devoted to these crops in each state. Unfortunately, I was
unable to find these data for all 50 states, or even the lower 48. I was able to find some
information on some crops, particularly oranges, but I was not able to find a complete set of
statistics on either tonnage or acreage for all of these hand-picked crops broken down by state.
They do tend to be concentrated in the warmer states, though.
H12C: There is a direct association between the average yearly temperature of a state and
the growth rate of the Latino population in that state.
I will now turn to the question of whether these variables are indeed associated with the
dummy “South” variable. Table 2-4 is a correlation coefficient matrix for the variables South,
urbanization rate, unionization rate, African American population percentage, and average yearly
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temperature. I never claimed that these variables were perfect stand-ins for the South, and
according to Table 2-4, none of them are perfectly correlated with “South.” Indeed, urbanization
is not statistically linked to South at p < .10, but it is correlated at p < .15, so it is salvageable for
the purposes of this study. The other variables (unionization rate, African American percentage,
and temperature) are all correlated to South at p < .001. It is worth repeating that I did not expect
each of these variables to be perfect replacements for the eleven states that rebelled in 1861.
Rather, I believe them to be factors that tend to cluster in the southern part of the country, and
they may have more explanatory power than a dummy variable that includes eleven out of fifty
states. Many of these variables are correlated to one another, but that was to be expected given
that these were all predicted to be observed in a single region of the country.
Table 2-4: Correlation Matrix for Model C
SOUTH
URBAN
UNION
AA2000
TEMP

SOUTH
1
-.22
-.62***
.67***
.69***

URBAN

UNION

AA2000

1
.32**
1
.03
-.32**
1
.20
-.51***
.56***
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05

TEMP

1

Hence, this model will regress the Latino population growth rate onto two sets of
variables. The first set is the “southern cluster” variables identified above as the percentage of
the state’s population that lives in cities, the percentage of a state’s population that is unionized,
the percentage of the state’s population that was African American in 2000, and the average
daily temperature. The second is the state’s 2000 Latino population and the state’s total
population growth. As above, I test for heteroskedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan and Cook-
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Weisberg tests, with the null hypothesis that the variance is constant, and I find that I cannot
reject null for Model C. Therefore, I do not report robust standard errors. Further, because many
of the variables are correlated with one another, there is a risk of multicollinearity occurring in
the model, which violates the multiple regression assumptions. This can result in variances that
are inflated, which in turn makes it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis. I ran a variance
inflation factor (VIF) test on the model. None of the variables had a VIF above 3, and the mean
VIF was 1.81. Therefore, the assumption of no multicollinearity was not violated.
Table 2-5: What Does "South" Mean? Model C Results
Expected Sign

Model C Coefficient (s.e.)

-

-1.02*** (.26)
-.41 (.77)

Southern Cluster Explanation
2000 African American Population Percentage
Average Daily Temperature

+
+

1.32*** (.37)
.27 (.47)

Demographic Variables
2000 Latino Population
Total Population Growth Rate

+

-4.33-6* (1.74-6)
1.12* (.47)

Southern Cluster Explanation
Urban percentage
Unionized percentage

Constant
F statistic (6, 43)
Adjusted R2
n

115.46*** (29.99)
12.39***
.58
50
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05

Table 2-5 above displays the results of Model C, which attempts to tease out the meaning
of “South” with regards to Latino population growth. In contrast to the earlier models, all
variables move in the predicted direction. Unionization rate and average daily temperature were
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not statistically significant at the specified levels of probability. It’s likely that unions no longer
hold the power over the workplace they once did. Likewise, I knew that temperature was an
imperfect measure of the types of produce that each state grow; additionally, a higher
temperature statistic includes the dry, western states like Nevada and New Mexico, which have
few farms and large preexisting Latino populations. Otherwise, the remaining variables
performed exactly as expected. The greater the portion of a state’s population that resided in
cities, the less likely Latinos were to migrate to that state. Conversely, the greater the African
American portion of the state’s population, the more likely Latinos were to migrate to that state.
As in Model B, Latino population growth was highest in the states where Latinos made up the
smallest portion of the population. Total population growth becomes a statistically significant
variable in Model C, albeit at a lower probability than urbanization and African American
percentage.
Consequently, it appears that Latinos broke with established settlement patterns during
the decade from 2000 to 2010. Although their numbers were not large in the southern states, the
period under study showed a sharp increase from a small base: per figure 2-2, nine states saw
their Latino population rise by over one hundred percent. At the national level, Latinos jumped
ahead of African Americans as the nation’s largest minority during the last decade, and this is
bound to have political implications in the future. Over time, Latinos may overtake African
Americans in the southern states, where African Americans, historically, were always the largest
minority group. This demographic shift may lead to changing representation in state legislatures,
in the U.S. Congress, and in the Electoral College. Likewise, such a demographic shift will alter
the local dynamic of politics, the economy, and race relations. Conversely, politics may halt the
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growth of the Latino population in the southern states, and in Chapter Three I will examine the
causes of restrictions enacted by state legislatures on noncitizens. Economically, this may lead
to increased competition for jobs, housing, and public benefits. Further, African Americans at
the lower end of the income and occupational ladder will find it hard to increase their income
because of competition for work from Latinos. This problem will be exacerbated for the
substantial number of African Americans who have been incarcerated for more than one year.
Conclusion

This chapter has established some established immigration patterns changed in the last
decennial census period, 2000 to 2010. Asian population growth was heavily correlated with
total population growth, and inversely correlated with the existing Asian population. The
general trend was for Asians to follow the total population. Latinos, on the other hand, migrated
in a fashion that introduced an unfamiliar demographic to states that did not previously have
large Latino populations. The research presented in this chapter found that the Latino population
growth was inversely correlated with the existing state Latino population. Further, Latino
population growth was consistently higher in southern states. When the variable “South” was
replaced with a set of variables that are clustered in the southern states, the results of the OLS
model show that Latinos were drawn to rural areas, and areas with a large concentration of
African Americans. Latino population growth tended to be lowest in states with a large existing
Latino population, while generally following total population trends. Literature suggests that this
was driven by the availability of low-skilled farm jobs. Latinos possibly replaced or displaced
African Americans in these low-skilled positions.
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What happens when a minority population rapidly grows in an area where there was not a
large concentration of that population? The next chapters will examine the types of policies that
states enacted regarding immigration, and whether there exists an association between the
findings of this chapter and the types of policies enacted. Chapter Three will examine
restrictions enacted by the states regarding immigration, and Chapter Four will examine
accommodations for noncitizens. Chapter Five will attempt to combine these separate findings
into one model. Finally, Chapter Six will conclude with an examination of the 2016 elections
and some thoughts regarding the future of immigration policy.

CHAPTER THREE: WHY DO STATES RESTRICT NONCITIZENS?

Many policy decisions made by states are either to adopt, or not to adopt, as in the case of
state lotteries (Berry and Berry 1990). Some policies require a decision about the efficacy of a
specific federal regulation, like water and air quality or automobile emissions; but even here, the
state merely decides to adopt a more stringent policy or accept federal standards (Welch and
Thompson 1980; Riverstone-Newell 2012; Nicholson-Crotty 2012). Some lawmakers might
consider recent undocumented immigrants as criminals, while others may view the same
individuals as a minority needing protection. Yet, immigration “policy” is not a binary decision.
There is a constellation of considerations that likely affect state immigration policy, including the
race or ethnicity of immigrant groups, the standing partisanship of state government, how
educated a state’s population is, and workforce supply and demand issues. In response, most
states in recent years have passed multiple immigration policies. Some could be classified as
accommodations for immigrants. Others could be classified as restrictions. Indeed, it is
common for countervailing policy moves to occur in the same legislative session, and sometimes
in the same bill.
This chapter will attempt to explain why states enacted laws that restricted noncitizens;
the next chapter will deal with accommodations enacted by the states. Adopting a restriction
indicates a clear policy direction on the part of the state government. To be sure, some
restrictions may be preempted by federal law, or overturned on civil rights grounds. However,
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my unit of analysis is the state; specifically, the policies being made by elected politicians
resided in state legislatures and the governor’s mansion. These laws capture a moment in time
when states took action on immigration matters. Though many immigration laws have been
challenged in court, and some overturned, each one had an impact on government functions,
private-sector firms, and the lives of immigrants for at least some time.
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has been gathering and publishing
data on state immigration laws since 2003. The NCSL has also created a searchable database of
state laws concerning immigration from 2008 to 2016. This chapter will use the NCSL’s
database to examine how and why states restricted their immigrant populations. The time period
under study is January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2014. I consider legislation restrictive if it cut
off some benefit to noncitizens, forbade certain immigrants from receiving licenses or
occupational credentials, prevented an individual or group from providing certain types of aid to
noncitizens, prevented a firm from employing or transacting with certain immigrants, or if it
subjects noncitizens to added scrutiny by state and local law enforcement. I will provide
examples below.
There were some laws passed by the states from 2009 to 2014 which will not be used in
this study. First, I do not include budget bills. Budget bills are typically used to manage
spending on existing programs and not to introduce new policies (Rubin 2011). Moreover, the
programs mentioned in budget bills are usually ones that were created by previous legislation;
therefore, including budget bills from the five-year span of this study might result in some
legislation being counted twice. When describing budget bills in the database, the NCSL
mentions the immigration-related budget items without linking them to the legislation that
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created the programs being funded. Second, I drop resolutions and commemorative legislation
because of their lack of policy weight; that is, resolutions passed by state legislatures may
indicate a preferred policy direction, but they do not actually create new policies or laws
respecting immigrants. Instead, most of these resolutions honor members of the community or
some immigrant group, praise or condemn the policies of the federal government, or call upon
the federal government to take some action. For example, in 2010 the Tennessee legislature
passed six resolutions. Three of them honored specific members of the community who were
immigrants. One praised the Obama administration for sending federal troops to the U.S.Mexico border, and one praised the state of Arizona for enacting SB1070. The sixth praised a
Baptist church for previous work with immigrants. However, none of the six resolutions passed
by the Tennessee legislature in 2010 changed that state's policy towards immigrants. A
systematic analysis of resolutions passed in other states finds that they also lack specific policy
prescriptions, as well. Therefore, I drop resolutions from the analysis and focus on substantive
policy changes.
Why did states take steps to restrict immigrants between 2009 and 2014? This research
question is important for several reasons. First, the determination of requirements for citizenship
has been the exclusive purview of the national government since the Fourteenth Amendment was
passed in the aftermath of the US Civil War. If states are passing substantive immigration
legislation, it may represent a new source of conflict in the intergovernmental relations between
the states and the national government. Depending on the number of federal and Supreme Court
vacancies over the next few years, and the ability of one party or the other to fill those vacancies,
states may have either a greater or reduced ability to restrict immigrants in the manner described
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above. Conversely, state restrictions may be preempted by federal law, if President Trump’s
Administration is able to implement restrictions on immigrants at the national level. Also, any
policy that restricts immigrants will touch upon issues of race and ethnicity. Since the passage of
the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965, the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that 51 percent
of immigrants to the U.S. came from Latin America, 25 percent from East and South Asia, and 8
percent came from the Middle East and Africa. 1 Put another way, more than four out of every
0F

five immigrants to the U.S. in the past 50 years have not been part of the traditional white, nonHispanic majority. As this country has, in the past, enacted discriminatory policies against
minorities at the national and state level, any new legislation regarding immigrations risks
repeating that history. Further, an individual is more likely to encounter state and local law
enforcement than federal law enforcement officers. Finally, state legislation concerning
immigrants may, in combination with the factors uncovered in chapter two, affect migration
among the states. This in turn may affect representation in Congress and the Electoral College.
In total, a more complete understanding of the impetus for immigration restriction is imperative.
The Manner in which States Restrict Immigrants

As noted, this chapter will examine state-level restrictions that were successfully enacted
from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2014. In the time period, the 50 American states enacted
a total of 303 new restrictions on immigrant populations. These restrictions could be categorized
in three ways. First, there were laws that prohibiting a government official from granting a

http://www.pewhispanic.org/2015/09/28/modern-immigration-wave-brings-59-million-to-u-sdriving-population-growth-and-change-through-2065/ (Accessed 1-2-2017)
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benefit, license, credential, or some other service to certain types of immigrants. Examples
include many laws which forbade state bureaus and municipalities from issuing occupational
credentials, certain types of licenses, or voter registration to immigrants who are not citizens or
lawful permanent residents. Another example of this category of restriction are laws that forbade
state courts from granting civil damages to unauthorized noncitizens. Also, state laws that cut
off employment insurance, healthcare subsidies, and other public benefits fall into this category.
The states likely felt empowered to cut off public benefits to non-citizens as a result of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which
gave states tremendous leeway in determining eligibility for social welfare programs.

Figure 3-1: State Restrictions for Noncitizens
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While the first category of laws targeted the behavior of state bureaus and municipalities,
the second targets firms and individuals. These laws prevent a private company or individual
from employing or conducting business with certain types of immigrants. The most common
examples of this are laws passed by many states which require contractors with the state
government to use E-Verify to verify the lawful status of employees. Also, several states made it
illegal for firms to purchase certain second-hand items from individuals unless the seller could
provide proof of identity; examples include automobiles, scrap metal, and recycled electronics.
Other ways in which the states restrict firms and individuals include prohibitions on renting
lodgings or transporting individuals who do not have proof of legal residence.
The final category were laws that essentially criminalize unauthorized presence in the
U.S. at the state level. These laws direct state criminal justice systems by instructing law
enforcement and the courts to take some action against an immigrant. The most notable
examples can be found in omnibus bills passed by several states. These bills often included
elements of the first and second categories, with additional instructions to law enforcement. For
example, Arizona’s SB1070 required police check for lawful presence during normal contact, as
did the omnibus bills enacted by Georgia, Alabama, Indiana, and other states. Arguably, the
states were empowered to do this by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which allowed the U.S. Attorney General to enter
agreements with state and local governments to perform immigration enforcement duties. These
omnibus bills were all passed between 2010 and 2012. 2 The abbreviated period of legislative
1F

http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/omnibus-immigration-legislation.aspx (last accessed
1-11-2017)
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activity regarding omnibus laws is probably due to several federal court rulings regarding this
type of legislation, which took place in 2012. In Arizona v. United States (2012), the Supreme
Court of the United States struck down some of the provisions in Arizona’s SB1070, but upheld
others. In United States v. State of Alabama, et al. (2012), a federal appeals court found that six
provisions of Alabama’s HB56 were preempted by federal law, out of ten which were
challenged. Yet, omnibus laws are not the only example in this third category. I also include
laws which expand the scope of existing laws, or increase existing legal penalties on immigrants
who lack proof of citizenship, a valid visa, or an alien registration number. Arizona passed a law
in 2009 which expanded the definition of human smuggling to include anyone who enters the
country illegally, and included extra state penalties for the “coyotes” who transport noncitizens
across the border. Oklahoma passed a law in 2010 that required any immigrant “unlawfully
present under federal immigration law” to submit a DNA sample upon arrest for any offense.
Table 3-1 presents the number of restrictions enacted in each state, along with the type of
restriction. Not surprisingly, instructions to state agencies and local governments make up two
thirds of the restrictions passed. This is probably due to Dillon’s Rule, which posits that cities,
counties, and other municipalities are entirely creatures of the state (Grumm and Murphy 1974).
Instructions to municipalities therefore represent a path of least resistance for the state
legislature. My reasoning is that local governments are less able to challenge a state law than
individuals or corporations, which can claim a civil rights violation. At the opposite end of the
spectrum are the omnibus bills, which made up fewer than a tenth of the total restrictions passed.
The omnibus bills included elements of Categories One and Two, but also compelled authorities
to act against some immigrants. The omnibus legislation was more burdensome to noncitizens
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than the other bills enacted, and I considered adding a weight in the count to reflect this.
However, because the omnibus bills were so few in number, adding a weight would not have
affected the outcome. Further, I suspect that the omnibus bills were relatively few in number
because of institutional arrangements within each state. Specifically, the states vary in how a
majority can push legislation through, particularly when it has the potential to create controversy.

Table 3-1: Number and Types of Restrictions by State
STATE
Arizona
Virginia
Georgia
Tennessee
Utah
Oklahoma
Alabama
California
Texas
Nebraska
Arkansas
Illinois
Missouri
Oregon
Colorado
Idaho
Maryland
West
Virginia
Minnesota

CATEGORY 1:
GOVT.
ENTITIES
19
16
13
9
10
8
9
10
9
8
9
8
6
7
6
6
7
4
6

0
3
2
5
4
1
1
1
2
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0

CATEGORY 3:
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
6
0
2
2
1
2
2
1
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
1
0

3

0

7

0

6

CATEGORY 2:
BUSINESSES

0
(Continued on next page)

TOTAL
RESTRICTIONS
25
19
16
16
15
13
12
12
11
10
9
8
8
8
7
7
7
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Table 3-1 (continued)
STATE
New
Hampshire
North
Carolina
North Dakota
Florida
Hawaii
Indiana
South
Carolina
South Dakota
Washington
Kansas
Maine
Massachusetts
Michigan
Mississippi
Montana
Pennsylvania
Vermont
Iowa
Louisiana
New Mexico
New York
Alaska
Connecticut
Kentucky
Nevada
New Jersey
Ohio
Rhode Island
Wisconsin

CATEGORY 1:
GOVT.
ENTITIES

CATEGORY 2:
BUSINESSES

CATEGORY 3:
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE

TOTAL
RESTRICTIONS

5

1

0

6

5

1

0

6

6
2
4
3

0
3
1
0

0
0
0
1

6
5
5
4

3

0

1

4

0
0
0

4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

4
3
2
1
3
3
3
3
1
3
1
0
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(Continued on next page)

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Table 3-1 (continued)
STATE
Delaware
Wyoming
TOTAL

CATEGORY 1:
GOVT.
ENTITIES
0
0
237

CATEGORY 2:
BUSINESSES
0
0
41

CATEGORY 3:
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
0
0
22

TOTAL
RESTRICTIONS
0
0
300

Demographic Explanations for Restriction

There are some other takeaways from Table 3-1. Just over half of all restrictions were
passed by the top ten most active states, and only the top eight states passed more than ten
restrictions in the time period studied, 2009 to 2014. Of the top ten most restrictive states, six
were once part of the Confederacy. In Chapter Two I found that Latino population growth
surged in the South. Why would the introduction of a new population increase the number of
restrictions passed by the states? Some scholars have found an association between the growth
of some populations and the adoption of restrictions against immigrants. M. V. Hood III and
Irwin L. Morris (1998) find that Anglo support for immigrant growth decreased as the population
of undocumented immigrants increased. Boushey and Luedtke (2011) find an association
between an increase in the foreign-born population of a state and the number of laws passed that
were intended to control immigrant populations. Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013) find that a
model using the growth rate of the state Hispanic population performed better in predicting the
passage of restrictive immigration laws, which mostly overlapped with the laws that Boushey
and Luedtke termed control laws. While narrowing in on the adoption of E-Verify laws at the
state level, Benjamin J. Newman, Christopher D Johnston, April A. Strickland, and Jack Citrin
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(2012) find that a drastic increase in the immigrant population was associated with a higher
probability of E-Verify adoption.
The first set of hypotheses will therefore use ethnic threat theory to explain state level
immigration restrictions. As in Chapter Two, I will present results for three models. However,
the dependent variable will remain the same: the number of restrictions passed by the states. The
reason I present results for three models is because the hypothesis sets are differentiated
according to national origin, race, and ethnicity. One key explanatory variable is the growth rate
of the state’s foreign-born population, the second key explanatory variable is the growth rate of
the state’s Asian population, and the third is the growth rate of the state’s Latino population.
Boushey and Luedtke (2011) test for the growth rate of the foreign-born population, and
Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013) test for the growth rate of the Latino population. I am
including the growth rate of the Asian population because previous scholarship omitted Asians
when testing for an ethnic threat; as noted in Chapter One there has been a colorful history of
Asian restriction and it is possible that Asians may represent an ethnic threat to some lawmakers,
today. This chapter fills in a gap in the literature by testing for such an effect.
Hypothesis H1A: The growth rate of the state foreign-born population is directly
associated with the number of restrictions enacted by the state.
Hypothesis H1B: The growth rate of the state Asian population is directly associated with
the number of restrictions enacted by the state.
Hypothesis H1C: The growth rate of the state Latino population is directly associated with
the number of restrictions enacted by the state.
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In addition, I will consider varying state education outcomes. Daniel Hopkins (2010),
using survey data, finds that as education level increases, opposition to immigration decreases. In
a separate study, Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox (2010) reach a similar conclusion. Justin
Berg (2009) finds that educated whites who have regular contact with nonwhites are more likely
to have positive attitudes regarding immigrants. Still further, researchers find an educated
workforce is less threatened by low-skilled immigrants (Hopkins 2010; Hainmueller and Hiscox
2010). Even though most of the work on education and attitudes toward immigration has been
done at an individual level of analysis, these findings are strong enough for me to consider
aggregate state-level educational achievement in studying restrictions on immigrants.
Hypothesis H2 will test whether level of education is associated with the number of
restrictions passed in each state. I predict that the higher the education level in the state,
measured as the percentage of the state’s population that has at least a bachelor’s degree, the
lower the anti-immigrant sentiment. My theory predicts that individuals who populate the lower
end of the income and occupational hierarchy feel more threatened by new immigrants. The
causal mechanism at play is that a better educated constituency will place less pressure on
elected officials to restrict immigrants.
H2: The percentage of the state’s population that has a college degree is inversely
associated with the number of restrictions enacted by the state.
Economic Explanations for Restriction

There are several economic factors which might also play a role in the adoption of
restrictions on immigration. Some of these variables may be necessary but not sufficient causes
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for restrictive activity on the part of the state. Jack Citrin, Donald Green, Christopher Muste, and
Cara Wong (1997) find a strong relationship between negative sentiment towards immigrants
and pessimism regarding the nation’s economy. Ellen Barkan (2003) finds further support for
this conclusion. Further, Ted Brader, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay (2008) find
news stories concerning the economic consequences of illegal immigration are more likely to
boost anxiety among whites when those stories contain images of Hispanics, Hispanic surnames,
or other ethnic cues. This anxiety they argue, “Triggered opposition to immigration and
multilingual laws… and led people to send anti-immigration messages to Congress” (975).
Vickie D. Ybarra, Lisa M. Sanchez, and Gabriel R. Sanchez (2015) use the Hispanic growth rate
and the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s State Coincident Index Change to explain state passage
of punitive legislation aimed at immigrants.
The works cited above point to economic anxiety as a factor in adopting anti-immigrant
sentiment. The question is, how to measure economic anxiety in a state? The state’s gross
domestic product (GDP) is a measure of the state’s overall economic health. Yet, large states
will naturally have a higher GDP than smaller states. I will therefore use the per capita GDP in
2010 as a measure of the state’s economic health.
H3: There is an inverse relationship between the state per capita GDP and the number of
restrictions enacted by the state.
As in Chapter Two, I will employ the state’s urban percentage as an independent
variable, but for different reasons. In Chapter Two, urban percentage was employed because the
southern states tend to be more rural. Here, and in Chapter Four to follow, I use the urban
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percentage to predict the count of a certain type of legislative activity concerning noncitizens.
My thinking is that, while GDP measures the amount of economic activity in a state, urban
percentage measures a type of economic activity. Of course, states with a lower urban
percentage will have a higher amount of agricultural activity than states with a higher
percentage. Further, I anticipate that states that are more urban are also more liberal. This is
problematic because I use a state ideological variable below. Yet, when I check for correlation,
state urban percentage is moderately correlated to per capita GDP with an r of .40, and is weakly
associated to state ideology with an r of .35. The stronger correlation to GDP leads me to
include it as an economic explanation. Therefore, I conclude that urban percentage is measuring
something similar to, but distinct from, the other variables in this model. Put another way, I
believe that the urban percentage is a measure of the state’s culture, and that culture plays a role
in the type of legislation enacted regarding noncitizens. I predict that a more rural population
will sway the state in the direction of restriction, and that as the urban percentage of a state goes
up, the number of restrictions goes down.
H4: There is an inverse relationship between the state urban percentage and the count of
restrictions enacted by the state.
Political Explanations for Restriction

Immigration may be a cross-cutting cleavage for the two major political parties in the US.
Business interests within the Republican Party want access to inexpensive labor, but social
conservatives in the Republican Party are opposed to an influx of non-Anglo members of society
(Jeong et al 2011). This tension has been addressed in recent scholarship and research suggests
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that the Republican Party tends to take a more restrictive stance towards immigration while the
Democratic Party supports a more “open door” policy (Reich and Barth 2012). Further, Zoltan
Hajnal and Michael U. Rivera (2014) find that whites who voice anti-immigrant sentiments are
less likely to identify as Democrats. These findings suggest that Republican or Democratic
control of government is one variable that should be used in an analysis of immigration laws, but
partisanship alone may not tell the whole story. Not all nativists have economic motivations. I
regard it as self-evident that many nativists are simply resistant to change. Thus, social
conservatism may be a factor in the adoption of restrictions against immigrants. Further, partisan
control of state government can change drastically in a decade, and often has more to do with
organizing ability and personal charisma than with one or two political issues. By contrast, the
overall liberal or conservative sentiment of a state population is more likely to remain static over
time. I will use William Berry’s updated score of citizen ideology to capture this phenomenon,
where a higher score indicates a more liberal state population, and vice versa.
H5: There is an inverse relationship between the state’s citizen ideology score and the
number of restrictions enacted by the state.
As noted per of the results in Table 3-1, some states enact more immigrant legislation
than other states. Importantly, some states simply pass more laws than other states. Part of the
variance in legislative activity at the state level can be explained as a function of how many
hours state legislators spend on the job. In some states, serving on the state legislature is a fulltime career where members are paid a salary, similar to the U.S. Congress. In other states,
serving on the state legislature is a part-time position that only pays a small stipend or
honorarium. At the very least, the degree to which serving on the state legislature is a full-time
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position should be used as a control variable, because these professionalized legislatures will
tend to pass more legislation than other legislatures. Boushey and Luedtke (2011) make a
convincing case for the inclusion of state legislative professionalism; yet, it is also the case that
more professional legislatures occur in more progressive states (Squire 1992). Other scholars
find that legislative professionalism has been used in a variety of contexts to explain state policy
outcomes (Maestas 2000; Woods and Baranowski 2006). Following Boushey and Luedtke
(2011), I will use Peverill Squire’s score (1992) of legislative professionalism. Squire’s score
uses the U.S. Congress as a baseline to create a score for each state measuring the degree to
which serving in the state legislature is comparable, in time commitment, salary, and resources,
to serving in Congress.
H6: States with professionalized legislatures will pass fewer restrictions on immigrants
than states with less professionalized legislatures.
There were other variables considered, but not used. Both Boushey and Luedtke (2011)
and Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013) used the state percentage of wage-earners who were in a
union as an explanatory variable. Their reasoning was that unions might lobby to restrict new
immigrants if they see new arrivals as a wage scale threat, and they may possess some power to
get state governments to pass restrictions on immigrants. In the latter article, the scholars found
that the unionization rate had an inverse association with the number of restrictions passed,
rather than the direct association that was predicted by theory. I suspect this is because
unionized employees are only about 11 percent of wage earners in the U.S., and half of union
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members are public employees. 3 Public employees may not see immigrants as a threat, because
2F

immigrants use the public services that public employees provide. Consequently, half of union
members may see immigration as job security rather than an economic threat. Moreover, most
state and municipal governments follow the lead of the federal government in requiring legal
authorization to work in the U.S. for public employment. Also, unions tend to be strongest in
socially liberal states, and my theory predicts that such states will pass fewer restrictions, not
more. This, combined with the overall decline in total union numbers since 1983, leads me to a
different conclusion regarding the role of unions in immigrant legislation than Márquez and
Schraufnagel (2013). I therefore drop unionization rate from my analysis of restriction to
concentrate on the key variables of ethnicity and economic anxiety that were uncovered in earlier
research (Boushey and Luedtke 2011, Márquez and Schraufnagel 2013, Ybarra et al. 2015).
My model will repeat one assumption from Chapter Two: most members of the public
cannot tell if an Asian or a Latino is foreign-born through casual contact, much less whether that
person has a valid visa or an alien registration number issued by the federal government. Put
another way, a person sitting in a fast food restaurant cannot tell if the other diners are
noncitizens by racial and ethnic cues alone. Many will adopt an anti-immigrant stance based on
racial and ethnic cues, without needing proof of an unauthorized presence in the U.S. I
considered employing total population growth as a control variable, as in Chapter Two, but I
decided against it for two reasons. First, total population growth is correlated to the other growth
variables used, foreign-born, Asian, and Latino. Though including total population growth may
increase the overall goodness of fit of each test, it will draw some explanatory power away from
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the other growth variables. Second, neither Boushey and Luedtke (2011), nor Márquez and
Schraufnagel (2013), nor Ybarra et al (2015) use total population growth as a control variable.
Hence, I will follow their lead. Table 3-2 displays descriptive statistics for the variables
employed in the model that follows.
Table 3-2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in the Explanation of State Immigration
Restrictions
Variables
State Restrictions
% Growth Foreign Born
% Growth Asian
% Growth Latino
% College Graduates
State GDP per capita
Urban percentage
Citizen Ideology
Legislative Professionalism
Total Population Growth

Mean
6.02
43.35
55.47
72.46
53.46
46,238.58
79.59
48.08
0.18
9.86

S.D.
5.4
20.18
20.09
30.12
9.20
8,541.26
14.56
8.81
0.12
7.26

Min. Value
0 (DE, WY)
11.1 (NY)
4.21(HI)
19.16 (NY)
23.4 (AK)
32,967 (MS)
38.7 (ME)
30.2 (UT)
0.03 (NH)
-0.55 (MI)

Max Value
25 (AZ)
92.1 (AL)
116.51 (NV)
147.89 (SC)
68.1 (MA)
69,667 (DE)
95 (CA)
63.2 (VT)
0.63 (CA)
35.15 (NV)

Table 3-2 illustrates some interesting points. First, two states, or four percent of the total,
passed no restrictions in the six years covered. The three growth rate statistics vary
considerably, from single digits to triple digits in the case of Asian population growth. The
percentage of a state’s population with college degrees goes from one quarter in Alaska to more
than two-thirds in Massachusetts. State per capita GDP more than doubles between Mississippi
and Delaware. According to the citizen ideology scores, Vermont is twice as liberal as Utah.
New Hampshire has the least professionalized legislature, while California has the most.
Michigan was the only state with negative total population growth, while Nevada’s population
grew by more than a third. Interestingly, none of the three specific populations considered had a

72
negative growth: the foreign-born population, the Asian population, and the Latino population
grew in all of the states, even though the overall population fell in one state (Michigan).
Why do States Enact Restrictions on Immigrants?

Because my dependent variable is a count of restrictions by the states, it is appropriate to
use a Poisson model to explain their occurrence (Gujarati 2003, 620). 4 I will report the
3F

coefficients, standard errors (s.e), and incidence rate ratios (IRR) for statistically significant
variables for each of my three key explanatory variables. The IRR statistic measures the average
proportional change in the count value of the dependent variable associated with a one-unit
increase in the explanatory variable, holding all other variables constant. Tables 3-3 will display
the results of a test where the foreign-born population growth is the key explanatory variable,
Table 3-4 will use the Asian population growth, and Table 3-5 will use the Latino population
growth rate. I am separating these three growth variables because I anticipate that they are
highly correlated to one another, and including them in the same model would violate another
assumption: no multicollinearity. To make sure that this assumption is not violated, I run a
variance inflation (VIF) test and find that when foreign-born growth is an independent variable,
the mean VIF is 1.57; when Asian growth is an independent variable, the mean VIF is 1.50; and

4

I understand that the mean of the dependent variable may not equal the variance, and this
violates an assumption of the Poisson. However, samples where the mean equals the variance
rarely occur when describing human behavior. all states were observed for the same length of
time and the sample does not have an excessive number of zeroes. The underlying assumption
of the Poisson is that the probability of a state enacting a restriction is constant when all other
variables are held constant, and I think that assumption holds. In other words, the likelihood of
one state enacting a third restriction is the same as another state enacting its tenth, controlling for
all other factors.
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then Latino growth is an independent variable, the mean VIF is 1.67. None of the variables
exceed a VIF of 10 in any of the three tests. I do not anticipate an autocorrelation error because I
am not using time series data.
Table 3-3: Restrictions and the Foreign-Born Growth Rate

Expected Sign
Demographic explanations
% Growth Foreign-Born

+

% College Graduates

-

Economic explanations
State GDP per Capita

-

Urban percentage

-

Political explanations
Citizen Ideology

-

State Legislative Professionalism

-

Constant
Chi2
Pseudo R2
n

RESTRICTIONS
Coefficient (s.e.)
IRR
.007 (.003)**
1.007
.014 (.009)†
1.014

-.00003 (9.34)***
.9999
.024 (.005)***
1.024

-.035 (.009)***
.965
.36 (.666)
1.437417
2.088 (.61)***
57.67
.15
50

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15
Table 3-3 displays the results of the Poisson model when the state foreign-born
population growth is a key explanatory variable. These results support the overall findings of
Boushey and Luedtke (2011) that the growth of the foreign-born population in the states is
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associated with the increase of what they call control legislation and what I have termed
restrictions. All explanatory variables are statistically significant except state legislative
professionalism. That said, two variables move in the opposite direction that is predicted by the
theory developed in this chapter. First, as the percent of the state population with college
degrees goes up, so do the number of restrictions enacted in the period under study. It is possible
that education level is an imperfect measure of how skilled the workforce is, or that even
educated workers feel threatened by increased competition for employment, along with other
possibilities. Second, as the urban percentage of a state goes up, so do the number of restrictions
enacted. I suspect this finding results from several western states that are highly urbanized but
also possess conservative legislators, like Utah and Arizona.
Yet, other parts of the theory survive. An increase in the foreign-born population growth
rate of the state is associated with an increase in the number of restrictions on immigrants
enacted by the state. A decrease in the state’s GDP and a decrease in the social liberalism of the
state’s population are also associated with an increase in restrictions enacted. Only state
legislative professionalism fails to meet the specified levels of statistical significance. I will now
examine the growth rate of the state Asian population as an explanation of restriction.
Table 3-4: Restrictions and the Asian Growth Rate

Expected Sign
Demographic explanations
% Growth Asian

+
(Continued on next page)

RESTRICTIONS
Coefficient (s.e.)
IRR
.008 (.003)***
1.008
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Table 3-4 (continued)
Expected Sign
% College Graduates

-

Economic explanations
State GDP per Capita

-

Urban percentage

-

Political explanations
Citizen Ideology

-

State Legislative Professionalism

-

Constant
Chi2
Pseudo R2
n

Coefficient (s.e.)
IRR
.02 (.009)**
1.02

-.00003 (9.24)***
.9999625
.019 (.005)***
1.01

-.04 (.009)***
.96
.63 (.69)
1.881293
2.23 (.56)***
60.21
.15
50

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15
Table 3-4 displays the results of the Poisson model when the state Asian population
growth is a key explanatory variable, replacing the growth rate of the foreign-born population.
The results are nearly identical to Table 3-3, where the foreign-born growth rate was the key
explanatory variable; the only differences are the levels of statistical significance. As in the
previous model, both the percentage of a state’s population with college degrees and the
percentage of the state’s population that lives in cities move in the opposite direction predicted
by theory. Both variables are associated with more restriction. As above, state GDP per capita
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and citizen ideology are inversely associated with restriction. Finally, state legislative
professionalism is not associated with restriction at the specified levels of significance.
Table 3-5: Restrictions and the Latino Growth Rate
RESTRICTIONS
Coefficient (s.e.)
IRR

Demographic explanations
% Growth Latino

+

% College Graduates

-

Economic explanations
State GDP per Capita

-

Urban percentage

-

Political explanations
Citizen Ideology

-

State Legislative Professionalism

-

Constant
Chi2
Pseudo R2
n

.004 (.002)*
1.004
.0125 (.009)
1.01

-.00003 (9.49)***
.9999666
.025 (.005)***

-.03 (.009)***
.963946
.49 (.68)
1.63
2.04 (.66)***
56.1
.14
50

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15
Table 3-4 displays the results of the Poisson model when the state Latino population
growth is a key explanatory variable. Again, the growth rate of a certain population, in this case
Latinos, is directly associated with an increase in the count of restrictions on noncitizens
educated by a state. Yet, the percentage of a state’s residents with a college degree is no longer
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associated with restriction at the specified levels of significance. This is at odds with the
findings reported in Tables 3-3 and 3-4. Given that the percentage of Latinos who possess
college degrees is so low (Parrado 2012), I posit that college graduates do not feel as much
anxiety about Latinos as they do about Asians and other foreign-born. As above, an increase in
the percentage of a state’s population that lives in cities is associated with restriction. Likewise,
state GDP per capita and citizen ideology are inversely associated with restriction, while
legislative professionalism continues to fail to reach statistical significance.
Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to answer the question, what compels a state to enact a
restriction on a noncitizen? There were several possibilities suggested by the literature. The
demographics of the state are important, and I test using the foreign-born population growth, the
Asian population growth, and the Latino population growth. I also test for the percentage of the
state’s population that possesses a college degree. Economics are also a factor, so I employ state
GDP per capita to test the relative strength of each state’s economy, controlled for population.
Political factors include citizen ideology and legislative professionalism. With the count of
restrictions enacted by each state as the dependent variable, I employ a Poisson regression to test
these different factors. I find that the outcomes of each test are very similar: whether the foreignborn population, Asian population growth, or Latino population growth is used, each is directly
associated with the count of restrictions enacted by the states. Each state’s per capita GDP and
citizen ideology statistics are inversely associated, as predicted by theory. Conversely, two
variables work in the opposite direction predicted: the percentage of a state’s population with a
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college degree and the percentage living in cities are directly associated with the number of
restrictions. Additionally, the college graduate statistic is no longer significant when the Latino
growth rate is the independent variable. I suspect that college graduates feel differently about
immigrants depending on which immigrant group is specified. Ideally, future research might
uncover the growth rate of the unauthorized Latino population; but that may not be necessary
given that the growth rate of the total Latino population is a statistically significant predictor of
restriction.
This model is far from perfect. First, it presents an incomplete picture of the state’s
activities towards noncitizens. I will address this shortcoming in the next two chapters. Also,
this research only covers legislation originating from the state legislature. It doesn’t cover
executive action by the state governor, nor rulings by state courts, nor ballot initiatives enacted
by voters. It also doesn’t cover local municipal actions, like zoning codes, vagrancy laws, and so
forth. These are other avenues by which localized opposition to immigration may occur, and
further research may examine these. Finally, this research, and the research that follows,
captures a specific period of time, from 2009 to 2015. There is probably a great deal of state
legislation affecting noncitizens that falls outside of this period. However, selecting this span of
time builds and continues the work of Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013). Further, if I go too far
outside this time period, the data from the 2010 Census ceases to be an accurate picture of the
country.
In Chapter Four, I will examine the enactment of accommodations on noncitizens. In
doing so, I will test several of the same variables used in this one. I will also note whether the
behavior of those variables is consistent. For example, in this chapter I find that the percent of
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the state’s population with a college degree is associated with the count of restrictions enacted by
the state. In Chapter Four, I will test whether that same variable is associated with
accommodations. It is possible that, because nearly all the states enacted both accommodations
and restrictions, a single statistic regarding the state may be associated with the count of both. If
this turns out to be the case, I will further address this behavior in Chapter Five, where I create a
measure that accounts for both restriction and accommodation.

CHAPTER FOUR: WHY DO STATES ACCOMMODATE NONCITIZENS?
As was stated in the previous chapter, the decisions to enact legislation concerning
immigrants is not binary. In addition to deciding whether to adopt or not adopt a new
immigration policy, states must also decide whether to restrict or accommodate immigrants.
This chapter will attempt to explain why some states accommodate immigrants during the period
under study, 2009 to 2014. These accommodations tend to support, rather than restrict,
immigrant populations. An accommodation extends some benefit or grants some protection to
immigrants, or otherwise supports immigrants in some manner. I will discuss examples below.
Enacting an accommodation indicates a clear policy direction for the state. I posit that such
accommodations are less likely to be overturned in a court of law because state governments
have the power to tax and spend, within reasonable boundaries. Conversely, accommodations
are more likely to be challenged at the ballot box if they do not accurately reflect the will of the
people. This chapter will test many of the same variables as Chapter Three with the anticipation
that some variables may exert more or a different pull on the dependent variable, measured as the
number of accommodating laws passed. As in Chapter Three, the unit of analysis is the
American state. These accommodations may signal whether a state wants immigrants, but also
what kind is most welcomed.
Many of the research design decisions made in Chapter Three will be repeated here. This
chapter will again use the National Council of State Legislature’s (NCLS) database to examine
how and why states accommodate their existing and/or future immigrant populations. The time
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period under study, again, is January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2014. I stick with the decision to
not include budget bills. Although some states passed budgets which increased spending on
welfare programs and services used by immigrants, the programs that are in a budget bill are
ones that were created by previous legislation; therefore, including budget bills during the fiveyear span of the study might result in some bills being counted twice. Second, as in Chapter
Three, I decided to drop resolutions and commemorative legislation because they have no policy
weight. There were a wealth of resolutions praising different immigrant groups (e.g. the Irish on
St. Patrick’s Day), but they did not change public policy. Figure 4-1 below displays the number
of accommodations enacted in each of the 50 states from 2009 to 2014.

Figure 4-1: State Accommodations for Noncitizens
Why do some states take steps to accommodate immigrants? This research question is
important for several reasons. The research will uncover the factors that are associated with
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accommodation. Some are economic, some political, and some have to do with the existing
demographic features of the state. Knowledge of these factors allows us to make predictions
about future state actions concerning immigration as conditions in a particular state shift over
time. Second, this legislation will inform about the manner in which noncitizens are viewed in
each state. It may be shown that the states vary in how much they accommodate noncitizens,
and immigrants may be more welcome in some states than others. Recall from Chapter One that
two-thirds of all immigrants since 1965 are either Latino or Asian. States that accommodate
immigrants will therefore run counter to the ethnic threat theory described in Chapter Three, and
this may further uncover positive attitudes regarding race and ethnicity as manifest by state
legislative action. Third, as in the previous chapter, accommodating legislation may affect
migration patterns in the American states. Intuitively, a more accommodating state posture
might attract immigrants, where restrictions would presumably repel them. Again, this will in
turn affect representation in Congress and the Electoral College if the numbers are sufficient to
affect the apportionment of legislative seats.
Types of Accommodations

As in the previous chapter, I distinguish between three types of policies. Among
accommodations, I have created three categories. In the first ‘accommodation’ category I place
laws that recognize noncitizens as qualified for some benefit, protection, license, or occupational
credential. In parallel to the first category of restrictions in Chapter Three, these laws consist of
instructions to local governments or state agencies. For example, some states allowed a
Matrícula Consular issued by the Mexican government to be used as a form of identification, in
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lieu of a passport or driver’s license. Some states issued driver’s licenses to noncitizens. One
common accommodation was recognition of medical degrees earned in other nations, which is
obviously an attempt to fill an area of occupational need. Others established services for migrant
labor camps.
In the period under study, nearly every state passed an important accommodation which
fell into the second category: new laws that outlawed human trafficking. Human trafficking
encompasses several illicit activities, but it primarily involves the use of coercion, abduction,
fraud, or deception to transport, abduct, or otherwise smuggle persons for the purposes of
exploitation. Although it could be argued that all of these things have been illegal since the
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000
created the legal definition of human trafficking and a framework for prosecuting such crimes.
Boushey and Luedtke (2011) categorize these as “control” laws because they regard this type of
legislation as an attempt to control the flow of persons into each state. However, Márquez and
Schraufnagel (2013) categorize these as “liberalizing” legislation because they regard these laws
as a protection against the exploitation of noncitizens. This chapter will follow Márquez and
Schraufnagel (2013), but will take a more nuanced approach based on the specific terms of each
piece of legislation enacted. Bills that made it illegal to force a person to perform illegal tasks or
work for free under threat of deportation were coded as accommodations, and the majority of
human trafficking legislation passed by the states fell under this category. Additionally, many
states passed legislation that created support services for victims of human trafficking, or made
victims eligible for existing support services. On the other hand, legislation that outlawed the
smuggling of human beings across the border, or sneaking into the country without
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authorization, was coded as a restriction and included under the third category of restrictions in
Chapter Three. The NCSL often coded such legislation under the “human trafficking” category
in their database. An argument could be made that state human trafficking legislation is
preempted by federal law, but that debate is outside the scope of this chapter.
Why did the states pass a large volume of human trafficking legislation in the first
decades of the twenty-first century? The TVPA pertains to forced labor and forced sex acts, and
has several clauses pertaining to citizenship and deportation. Yet, I would argue that most of the
exploitation of noncitizens occurs intrastate rather than interstate. If an employer forces
noncitizens to work, typically such exploitation is occurring within a state, and rarely will the
employer take exploited workers across state lines. These state laws went beyond federal laws
by expanding the number of acts that constitute human trafficking, setting up task forces and
committees to investigate human trafficking, establishing special services for victims, and even
exempting victims from the state restrictions covered in Chapter Three. A human trafficking law
that was enacted by North Dakota in 2009 went so far as to criminalize the use of coercion in the
removal of a noncitizen’s organs. I posit that human trafficking is a case of a policy whose time
has come, in the manner described by Robert L. Savage (1985): this was a widespread problem,
the federal government served as a propagating agency by passing the TVPA in 2000, and there
was little resistance to the passage of laws that punish people who exploit vulnerable populations
(women, immigrants, children, etc.). Thus, most states have now enacted their own human
trafficking legislation, in addition to federal legislation.
Another accommodation that several states passed was the Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, which fits into the third category of state legislation
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that accommodates noncitizens. Like the omnibus bills that were examined in Chapter Three,
the state versions of the DREAM Act varied in their details, but essentially had the same
purpose: to accommodate aliens who had been brought to the U.S. as children, and had not been
convicted of any crimes. I will now detail some of the history of the DREAM Act at the national
level, which was touched on in Chapter One, before turning to a state level analysis. The
original DREAM Act was proposed in Congress in 2001. In 2010, the Democrat-controlled
House of Representatives passed a version of the DREAM Act, but it failed a cloture vote in the
Senate. The 2010 DREAM Act would have provided an avenue for unauthorized noncitizens,
who had been brought to the U.S. as children and graduated from a U.S. high school or general
education diploma (GED) program, to meet eligibility requirements for permanent residency.
From there they would be able to apply for citizenship, if they were not criminals apart from the
crime of unlawful presence (Russell 2011).
Despite the failure to pass the DREAM Act at the national level in 2010, many states
enacted their own legislation extending in-state tuition to unauthorized noncitizens. Obviously,
states cannot provide a path to citizenship for these same individuals. Yet, they can provide
easier access to one of the qualifications for lawful, permanent residency: a postsecondary
education. According to the NCSL, 18 states have passed provisions for in-state tuition for
unauthorized noncitizens who have graduated from high school or completed a GED, and who
are otherwise not criminals. Indeed, Texas and California had already offered in-state tuition to
unauthorized noncitizens before the federal DREAM Act was passed by the House of
Representatives. Some states, like New Mexico and Texas, have gone so far as to offer access to
publicly-funded financial aid. Others, like California, have offered access to private financial
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aid. On the other hand, some states, like Arizona and Georgia, have banned unauthorized
noncitizens from receiving in-state tuition, and these provisions were covered in Chapter Three
as part of the first category of restrictions. Obviously, for this chapter, I have coded state
versions of the DREAM Act as accommodations.
Finally, there is a fourth distinct category of accommodations. In 2005 the national
government enacted the REAL ID Act, which set standards for state identification. If states meet
these standards, identification cards from those states could be used for airline travel, access to
federal buildings, and so forth. Not surprisingly some states enacted legislation which forbade
compliance with REAL ID, citing a states’ rights arguments. Though noncitizens were not the
target of these laws, they benefitted indirectly because noncompliance with REAL ID made state
identification easier to acquire. This makes the enactment of anti-REAL ID laws at the state
level unique in that the intent was neither to restrict nor accommodate. I considered dropping
them from my analysis, but, unlike commemorative legislation and budget acts, these laws
represented new state policies that had a substantive effect on noncitizens, even if the benefit was
tangential. Thus, I chose to keep the anti-REAL ID laws and code them as accommodations,
because it took a separate piece of legislation to make a state ID harder to acquire. It is possible
that some states resisted REAL ID without enacting a separate law which made ID’s more
difficult for noncitizens to obtain; if that’s the case, then the state accommodated noncitizens by
resisting REAL ID.
Table 4-1: Types of Accommodations
STATE
California

GENERAL
TRAFFICK
DREAM
39
1
8
(Continued on next page)

REAL ID

0

ALL
46
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Table 4-1 (continued)
STATE
Illinois
Utah
Florida
Virginia
Texas
Colorado
Oregon
Arizona
Louisiana
Connecticut
Maryland
Minnesota
Oklahoma
Washington
Arkansas
Kansas
Indiana
Maine
New York
Rhode Island
New Mexico
Idaho
Vermont
Hawaii
Nebraska
Nevada
North Carolina
Alabama
Kentucky
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
New Hampshire
New Jersey

GENERAL

TRAFFICK

DREAM

9
1
15
3
8
2
7
4
9
3
8
2
9
0
4
3
6
1
6
1
7
1
7
0
5
3
5
1
6
2
4
3
6
0
4
2
6
0
1
5
4
1
5
0
3
2
4
0
4
0
4
0
1
1
2
1
3
0
3
0
1
1
3
0
2
0
3
0
(Continued on next page)

0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

REAL ID

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0

ALL
16
14
11
12
12
11
10
8
9
8
8
8
8
6
7
7
6
6
6
6
5
5
5
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
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Table 4-1 (continued)
North Dakota
Tennessee
West Virginia
Georgia
Iowa
Mississippi
Wyoming
Massachusetts
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Alaska
Delaware
Ohio
Wisconsin
TOTALS

2
2
3
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
235

1
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
52

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15

0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6

3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
308

It is difficult to generalize from the information displayed in Table 4-1. It is not
particularly surprising that California enacted the most accommodations, given that the Golden
State has a huge immigrant population. Yet, second on the list is Utah, a sparsely populated and
conservative state. It is possible that the large concentration of Mormons in the state has affected
this outcome, because it is well-known that within the Church of Latter Day Saints there is a
strong missionary tradition (Jacobs et al 2015). It is also not surprising to see Illinois, Texas, and
Florida in the top ten. However, other top ten states like Colorado and Oregon have never been
considered gateway states for new arrivals in the U.S. Clearly, there are several factors at work,
and this chapter will attempt to find them out.
As in Chapter Three’s examination of restrictions, instructions to state agencies and local
governments constituted the bulk of legislation enacted. I suspect this is for the same reason: it
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is easier for a state to direct these entities than it is to direct an individual or private firm, because
municipalities and state agencies are creatures of the state which created them. Note in Table 41, California and New York did not pass legislation outlawing human trafficking during the
period under study. This is notable because both states are among the six traditional immigrant
gateways identified in Chapter Two. With further research, I found that both states had already
enacted human trafficking legislation prior to 2009; in fact, California enacted its human
trafficking legislation in 2001, a year after the TVPA. California and New York effectively
lapped the other states with regards to this particular accommodation. As stated above, some
states also offered in-state tuition before the time period under study. This means that such
accommodations were not captured by the analysis performed in this chapter. I do not think this
is a problem because there were 308 total accommodations enacted from 2009 to 2014, and that
includes the states that passed human trafficking laws and in-state tuition rates. Thus, the states
that enacted these accommodations before the period under study also enacted other
accommodations that are captured by the model.
Demographic Explanations for Accommodation

Some factors may affect both restriction and accommodation, while others may be unique
to accommodations. Recall from Chapter Two that nearly three quarters of immigrants who
have arrived in the U.S. since 1965 have been either Latino or Asian. Given the racial and ethnic
composition of new immigrants, it is self-evident that the demographics of a state may sway how
it responds to immigrants. In Chapter Three I found that the rapid growth of an unfamiliar
population, Latinos, is associated with restrictions on immigrants at the state level. The inverse
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may be true for accommodations; that is, a well-established foreign-born, Asian, and Latino
population may lobby state government to pass accommodations for immigrants instead of
restrictions. There is scholarship which suggests that demographics may play a role in the
enactment of accommodations for immigrants. Francisco I. Pedraza (2014) finds that few Latino
citizens support restrictions on immigration, probably due to the importance of group identity
over individual experience. There is also evidence that living among diverse populations may
shape how people feel about immigration. Shang E. Ha (2010) finds that non-Hispanic white
Americans who live among Asians are more likely to hold positive views regarding immigration;
however, Ha also finds that contact with Latinos and Asians is also associated with antiimmigration sentiment in some cases. Stella M. Rouse, Betina Cutaia Wilkinson, and James C.
Garand (2010) find that Latino attitudes concerning immigration vary according to several
factors, including national origin and whether they are foreign-born or second generation.
Further, Regina Branton (2007) finds that Latino attitudes concerning immigration are tied to
how long the respondent has been in the United States. James M. Avery, Jeffrey A. Fine, and
Timothy Márquez (2016) find that greater Latino electoral strength is associated with fewer
restrictions enacted by the states.
This chapter will extend the findings of Avery, Fine, and Márquez (2016) by using
accommodations, not restrictions, as the dependent variable; and also by using the size of a
state’s foreign-born population, Asian population, and Latino population as key explanatory
variables. As in the previous chapters, I will present three models: one for the state foreign-born
population, one for the state Asian population, and one for the state Latino population. It may be
that some groups have more lobbying strength than others. Likewise, it may be some
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explanatory variables are significant when one population is used, but not others. I will use the
total state population as a control variable.
H1A: The state’s foreign-born population is directly associated with the number of
accommodations enacted by the state.
H1B: The state’s Asian population is directly associated with the number of
accommodations enacted by the state.
H1C: The state’s Latino population is directly associated with the number of
accommodations enacted by the state.
As in Chapter Three, I will use the percentage of a state’s population with a college
degree as an explanatory variable. In the previous chapter, I was testing to see if a higher
percentage of the state population with a college degree was associated with a decrease in the
number of restrictions enacted by a state. Several scholars find that economic weakness is
associated with opposition to immigration (Hopkins 2010; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). Here,
I will test whether a higher percentage of state residents with a college degree is associated with
an increase in the number of accommodations enacted. Justin Berg (2009) finds that educated
whites who have regular contact with nonwhites are more likely to have positive attitudes
regarding immigrants. I will test whether positive attitudes translate into legislation concerning
noncitizens.
H2: There is a direct association between the percentage of a state’s population with a
college degree and the number of accommodations enacted by the state.
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Economic Explanations for Accommodations

In the previous chapter I tested whether some economic factors played a role in the
enactment of restrictions on noncitizens at the state level. Several scholars find that economic
anxiety is associated with anti-immigrant sentiment (Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997;
Barkan 2003; Brader, Valentino, Suhay 2008). As in the previous chapter, I will use per capita
GDP as a measure of economic health in the state. I will also use one more economic variable:
per capita welfare spending in each state in 2010. My reasoning is that greater welfare spending
can be viewed as a measure of how much a state is willing to accommodate disadvantaged
populations. I posit that whatever factor causes a state to spend on welfare may also compel a
state to accommodate noncitizens, even if this accommodation consists of nothing more than
extending employment credentials or in-state tuition to noncitizens who attend community
colleges. Finally, I will reuse the urban percentage from Chapter Three. Again, I believe that
the urban percentage is a measure of the state’s culture, and that culture plays a role in the type
of legislation enacted regarding noncitizens. In contrast to Chapter Three, I predict that a more
urban population will sway the state in the direction of accommodation, and that as the urban
percentage of a state goes up, the number of accommodations will also go up.
H3: There is a direct relationship between a state’s per capita GDP and the count of
accommodations enacted by the state.
H4: There is a direct relationship between a state’s per capita welfare spending and the
count of accommodations enacted by the state.
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H5: There is a direct relationship between a state’s urban percentage and the count of
accommodations enacted by the state.
Political Explanations for Accommodation

I will now turn to the role of politics. Specifically, I will test how political factors like
ideology, partisanship, and legislative professionalism influence the enactment of
accommodations for noncitizens at the state level. Bruce E. Cain, D. Roderick Kiewiet, and
Carole J. Uhlaner (1991) find that the longer Latinos spend in the United States, the more likely
they are to self-identify as Democrats; conversely, the longer Asians spend in the United States,
the more likely they are to self-identify as Republican. R. Michael Alvarez and Lisa Garcia
Bedolla (2003) describe how both Democrats and Republicans actively pursued Latino voters;
despite this, over 50 percent of Latinos self-identified as Democrats, while approximately half
that number self-identified as Republicans. Zoltan Hajnal and Michael U. Rivera (2014) find
that whites who demonstrate anti-immigrant sentiment are less likely to self-identify as
Democrats. Alan Yang and Rudolfo O. de la Garza (2016) find that Latinos are more likely to
voice support for an expanded socioeconomic safety net, a policy that is favored by Democrats
rather than Republicans.
Much of the literature cited in this section has centered on whether Latinos and Asians
self-identify as Democrat or Republican. Matthew Levendusky (2009) finds that since the
1970’s, partisanship has become associated with ideology. Whereas the Republican Party and
Democratic Party used to house both liberals and conservatives, now liberals are more likely to
self-identify as Democrat or Democrat-leaning and conservatives are more likely to identify as
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Republican or Republican-leaning. I would argue that the real issue is whether the state’s
foreign-born population, Asian population, or Latino population are liberal or conservative in
their outlook towards immigration, and I will assume that a large enough group can influence or
move state governments towards restriction or accommodation, regardless of which party
controls the government. Thus, I will use the Berry citizen ideology score as an indicator of how
liberal or conservative the state’s population is, because I posit that party control of government
can change over time while public attitudes remain static.
H6: There is a direct association between the citizen ideology score of a state and the
count of accommodations enacted by the state.
As in Chapter Three, I will use each state’s Squire score of legislative professionalism as
a variable in the model. In the previous chapter this variable was not a statistically significant
predictor of restriction, but I have reason to believe that legislative professionalism may be
associated with accommodations. Peverill Squire (1992) finds that full-time, professionalized
legislatures tend to be more diverse than less professionalized legislatures. Recall that threequarters of immigrants since 1965 have been either Latino or Asian. I posit that a more diverse
legislature will have a greater concern for racial and ethnic minorities, and may enact more
accommodations.
H7: A state’s legislative professional (Squire score) is directly associated with the count
of accommodations enacted by the state.
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Table 4-2: Descriptive Statistics Regarding Accommodations Passed by States
Variables

MEAN

S.D.

MIN. VALUE
0 (AK, DE, OH,
WI)

Accommodations

5.3

5.61

Foreign Born 2010

801,496

1,659,908

15,843 (WY)

Asian 2010

293,063

712,836

4,426 (WY)

MAX. VALUE
35 (CA)

Latino 2010

1,008,457 2,401,111

9,208 (VT)

Total Population 2010

6,162,876 6,848,235

563,626 (WY)

% College Graduates
GDP per capita
Welfare Spending per
capita
Urban percentage
Citizen Ideology
Legislative Professionalism

53.46
46,238.58

9.20
8,541.26

23.4 (AK)
32,967 (MS)

10,150,429
(CA)
4,861,007 (CA)
14,013,719
(CA)
37,253,956
(CA)
68.1 (MA)
69,667 (DE)

1508.10

401.56

812.28 (MS)

2527.89 (DE)

79.59
48.08
0.18

14.56
8.81
0.12

38.7 (ME)
30.2 (UT)
0.03 (NH)

95 (CA)
63.2 (VT)
0.63 (NV)

Table 4-2 above displays descriptive statistics for the variables used in this chapter.
Remarkably, compared to Table 3-2 in the previous chapter, the mean and standard deviation for
both the restrictions and accommodations are nearly identical. The only major difference is that
the maximum number of accommodations is over 50 percent higher than the maximum number
of restrictions. California tops the list of accommodations enacted, and the Golden State also
tops all of the population values. Wyoming is the minimum population value for all but the 2010
Latino population, where Vermont is the state with the lowest population value. Yet, California
did not top any of the growth rate values in Table 3-2, thereby supporting the conclusion from
Chapter Two where I find that the chain migration hypothesis was not supported. Vermont, the
state that spends the most on welfare, expends three times as much per capita as the state that
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spends the least, Mississippi. The descriptive statistics for the other independent variables carry
over from Chapter Three.
Why do States Accommodate Noncitizens?

As in Chapter Three, I use a Poisson model to explain the count of accommodations
enacted by a state (Gujarati 2003, 620). 1 As above, an OLS regression will not be appropriate
0F

because the dependent variable is not continuous, therefore violating the assumption of linearity.
I will report the coefficients, standard errors (s.e), and incidence rate ratios (IRR) for statistically
significant variables for each of my three key explanatory variables. The IRR statistic measures
the average proportional change in the count value of the dependent variable associated with a
one-unit increase in the explanatory variable, holding all other variables constant. Table 4-3 will
display the results of a test where the size of the state’s foreign-born population is the key
explanatory variable, Table 4-4 will use the size of the Asian population, and Table 4-5 will use
the size of the Latino population. I am separating these three population variables because I
anticipate that they are highly correlated to one another, and including them in the same model
would violate another assumption: no multicollinearity. To make sure that this assumption is not
violated, I run a variance inflation (VIF) test. I find that when foreign-born population size is an
independent variable, the mean VIF is 2.05; when Asian population size is an independent
variable, the mean VIF is 2.08; and then Latino population size is an independent variable, the

1

As in Chapter Three, the mean of the dependent variable does not equal the variance. I believe
that there is an equal chance of one state enacting its third accommodation as another state
enacting its tenth, and so the underlying assumption of a Poisson is not violated.
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mean VIF is 1.94. None of the variables exceed a VIF of 10 in any of the three tests. I do not
anticipate an autocorrelation error because I am not using time series data.
Table 4-3: State Foreign-Born Population and Accommodation

Expected Sign
Demographic Explanations
Foreign-Born Population

+

% Graduated College

+

ACCOMMODATIONS
Coefficient (s.e.)
IRR
3.31 (4.65)***
1
.004 (.009)
1.004

Economic Explanations
GDP per capita

+

Welfare spending per capita

+

Urban percentage

+

-.00001 (9.62)
.99
-.0002 (.0002)
.99
.018 (.006)***
1.01

Political Explanations
Citizen Ideology

+

Squire Score

+

Constant
Chi2
Pseudo R2
n

.007 (.01)
1.007
-3.18 (.97)***
.041235

.87 (.59)†
2.4
167.96***
.38
50
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15 (one–tailed tests)
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The results for the model using the state’s foreign-born population as a key explanatory
variable are reported in Table 4-3 above. As predicted, the size of a state’s foreign-born
population is directly associated with the number of accommodations passed at p < .01, which
suggests that the state’s foreign-born population are able to lobby the state government to
accommodate noncitizens. Neither the percentage of the state population which graduated
college, nor the state per capita GDP, nor per capita welfare spending, nor citizen ideology were
associated with the number of accommodations enacted by the state. Notably, the college
graduate statistic moves in a positive direction with accommodation, while it moved in a positive
direction with restrictions in Chapter Three. What is even more surprising is that the percentage
of a state’s population that lives in cities is directly associated with the enactment of
accommodations by the state. Recall from Chapter Three that this statistic is also directly
associated with restriction. This leads me to believe that urban percentage is, in reality,
associated with any legislative activity concerning noncitizens. I will deal more directly with
this problem in Chapter Five, where I create a more comprehensive measure of state sentiment
regarding noncitizens. Another surprising result is that the Squire score of legislative
professionalism was significant in this model, but does not move in the predicted direction; that
is, per the model, an increase in the professionalization level of the state legislature is associated
with a decrease in the expected counts of accommodations for noncitizens. It is possible that the
states with more professionalized legislatures, like California and New York, enacted
accommodations before the time period in this model, as they would have encountered
immigrants before other states. Also possible is that professionalized legislatures have legislated
at noncitizens in other areas not covered by the NCSL database. Further, it is possible that using
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the state’s foreign-born population as an explanatory variable is drawing away the explanatory
power of the diversity that tends to accompany a professionalized legislature.
Table 4-4: State Asian Population and Accommodation

Expected Sign
Demographic Explanations
Asian Population

+

% Graduated College

+

ACCOMMODATIONS
Coefficient (s.e.)
IRR
7.36 (1.05)***
1
.008 (.008)
1.008

Economic Explanations
GDP per capita

+

Welfare spending per capita

+

Urban percentage

+

-.00002 (9.85)**
.99
-.0001 (.0002)
.99
.02 (.006)***
1.02

Political Explanations
Citizen Ideology

+

Squire Score

+

Constant
Chi2
Pseudo R2
n

-.0001 (.01)
.99
-3.8 (.06)***
1.022

.75 (.58)
168***
.38
50
†
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; p < .15 (one–tailed tests)

Table 4-4 displays the results of the Poisson model when the state Asian population is a
key explanatory variable. In light of the findings reported in Table 4-3 above, there are some
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interesting results here. The state’s Asian population is directly associated with the count of
accommodations enacted at p < .01. The urban percentage was again directly associated with the
count of accommodations enacted, and I have addressed this result above. Also, as above, the
state college graduate and citizen ideology statistics are not associated with the dependent
variable at the specified levels of significance. Yet, defying my theory, as per capita GDP goes
down accommodations go up. It may be that states with large Asian populations view
accommodation of noncitizens as a way of increasing economic activity. Keep in mind, in
Chapter Two I find that the best predictor of Asian population growth is total population growth.
However, the foreign-born population growth was correlated to the Latino population growth
with an r of .85, and one of the findings of Chapter two was that the Latino population grew in a
nonrandom fashion. Therefore, it should not be too surprising that using the size of the Asian
population as the key explanatory variable would produce different results. These results may
indicate some substantial difference in the distribution of the foreign-born and Asians across the
American states. I will now replace Asian population with Latino population, and then examine
how the variables behave.
Table 4-5: State Latino Population and Accommodation
ACCOMMODATIONS
Coefficient (s.e.)
Expected Sign
IRR
Demographic Explanations
1.59 (2.30)***
Latino Population
+
1
.008 (.009)
% Graduated College
+
1.008
(Continued on next page)
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Table 4-5 (continued)

Expected Sign
Economic Explanations
GDP per capita

+

Welfare spending per capita

+

Economic Explanations
Urban percentage

+

ACCOMMODATIONS
Coefficient (s.e.)
IRR
-.00001 (9.78)
.9999
-.0003 (.0002)†
.999

.018 (.006)***
1.01

Political Explanations
Citizen Ideology

+

Squire Score

+

Constant
Chi2
Pseudo R2
n

.008 (.01)
1.008
-1.20 (.74)*
.300

1.98 (.73)***
155.41***
.35
50
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15 (one–tailed tests)

Table 4-5 displays the results of the model using the state’s Latino population as a key
explanatory variable. In this model, state Latino population is associated with accommodations
enacted. Also, state GDP per capita and citizen ideology are not associated with the count of
accommodations enacted by the state. Per capita welfare is inversely associated with
accommodation, and I will address that below. Otherwise, urban percentage and the Squire
score behave in the manner predicted by theory: both are directly associated with
accommodation.
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The urban percentage is associated with both a count of restrictions and accommodations.
Clearly, this behavior by a statistically significant independent variable undermines the basis for
this chapter and the one that precedes it: restrictions and accommodations should be mutually
exclusive. There were fewer than a dozen laws that were coded as both restricting and
accommodating, but such a small number should not affect the results. The urban percentage
variable must be affected by some antecedent that affects both the count of restrictions and
accommodations. The performance of the urban percentage statistic in both a count of
restrictions and accommodations leads me to believe that it is really associated with the total
volume of legislation regarding noncitizens. In Chapter Five, I will reuse this variable in a new
measure of state sentiment regarding noncitizens to better calibrate the influence of a state’s
urban population on noncitizen legislation.
I will now return to the issue of welfare and accommodations, because the result when
the Latino population is identical to the result when the Asian population is used: per capita
welfare spending is inversely associated with accommodation. With regards to the relationship
between state welfare and accommodations, there may be several possible reasons why an
increase in per capita welfare is associated with a decrease in the expected count. It may be that
there is a tipping point where states which are already generous in welfare benefits are unwilling
to spend more, particularly on noncitizens. Yet, many of the accommodations, such as
recognizing employment credentials earned outside the United States, cost the state very little. It
could be argued that offering noncitizens in-state tuition costs the state two ways: they forego
additional tuition dollars, and noncitizens may take slots away from citizens. However, it seems
unlikely that “Dreamers” would attend college if they had to pay more. Also, slots are more
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frequently used for graduate school, which has higher admissions standards, than undergraduate
degree programs. An alternative explanation for the behavior of per capita welfare spending in
the models above is the possibility that generous states passed accommodations for noncitizens
before the period under study, effectively lapping the field. Recall that this was the case with
some human trafficking legislation. Put another way, the most generous states may have passed
accommodations prior to the period covered by this study. Even so, California passed the most
accommodations from 2009 to 2014, despite that California’s anti-human trafficking legislation
is not captured by the model. Thus, the explanation for why per capita welfare spending is
inversely associated with the count of accommodations remains elusive.
Across the three sets of results displayed above, the state foreign-born statistic is a very
strong predictor of the count of accommodations enacted by the states. This statistic includes
both naturalized citizens, who can vote, and noncitizens, who cannot vote. The fact that this is
the strongest factor in accommodating noncitizens suggests that there is a strong group identity
among the foreign-born population in the American states. Rather than forget about immigrants
after taking the citizenship oath, naturalized citizens appear to influence the state government to
accommodate noncitizens. This pattern continues when “foreign-born” is replaced by the Asian
population and the Latino population, respectively, and that is not surprising given the
correlation between those variables. Yet, the foreign-born statistic and Asian statistic are both
significant at p < .001, while the Latino statistic is only significant at p < .01. This may be
affected by the newness of the Latino population to some states. Recall from Chapter Two that
Latinos appeared to be moving into new states, particularly in the South, while Asian population
growth appeared to follow total population growth. Over time, Latinos may gain some political
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clout to influence policy towards noncitizens in the states where the Latino population is
growing. The election of Donald Trump to the White House, though, makes it doubtful that
unauthorized noncitizens will be given a path to naturalization and citizenship anytime soon.
Conclusion

This chapter attempts to explain why states accommodate noncitizens. This research
complements Chapter Three, which focused on restrictions, and is important for many of the
same reasons. Hopefully, this research paints a more complete picture of why and how states
treat noncitizens. There were several factors suggested by the literature. The demographics of
the state are important, and I test using the size of the state’s foreign-born population, Asian
population, and Latino population. I also test for the percentage of the state’s population that
possesses a college degree. Economics are also a factor, so I employ state GDP per capita to test
the relative strength of each state’s economy, controlled for population. I also test for per capita
welfare spending and the urban percentage of the state. Political factors include citizen ideology
and legislative professionalism. With the count of accommodations enacted by each state as the
dependent variable, I employ a Poisson regression to test these factors. I find that the state’s
foreign-born, Asian, and Latino populations all exert some pull on the dependent variable,
though with the Latino population having the least pull. Per capita welfare spending is inversely
associated with the dependent variable, which was not predicted by theory. Other independent
variables behaved differently depending on which population statistic was used. The Squire
score was inversely associated with accommodation when the foreign-born population statistic
was used, but directly associated with accommodation when the Asian and Latino population
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statistics were used, respectively. The percent of the state population with a college degree was
only significantly associated with accommodation when the Latino population statistic was used.
The state citizen ideology score was not significant in any model.
This research suffers many of the shortcomings of Chapter Three’s model. This model
covers legislation originating from the state legislature but omits executive action by the state
governor, rulings by state courts, and ballot initiatives enacted by voters. Likewise, local
initiatives like sanctuary city and county statutes are not covered; additionally, the recent
“sanctuary state” policies in California, Oregon, New Mexico, Colorado, Rhode Island, and
Vermont are not included in this period. Further research may examine these, and illuminate
processes by which local and state governments protect noncitizens in response to a Republican
regime under President Donald J. Trump that is now hostile to immigration. Finally, both
Chapter Three and this one both suffer from a flaw where at least one variable, urban percentage,
is directly associated with both a count of restrictions and a count of accommodations. I don’t
think this is flaw in the categorization of the state laws; rather, I suspect that urban percentage is
associated with the total volume of legislative attention to immigration at the state level. In
Chapter Five, I will devise a measure of state sentiment that incorporates both restrictions and
accommodations, and this will place the urban percentage in its proper context.

CHAPTER FIVE: STATE SENTIMENT REGARDING NONCITIZENS
I have considered the restrictions that states have enacted concerning noncitizens in
Chapter Three, and the accommodations that states have enacted in Chapter Four. Though both
chapters uncovered some important factors regarding state immigration policy in the period
under study, looking at restrictions and accommodations separately presents an incomplete
picture of state immigration action. For example, a state might enact legislation that prevents
participation in REAL ID, and I have designated this action as an accommodation. Yet, the same
state might prohibit unauthorized noncitizens from being issued a driver’s license, and might
require the use of E-Verify, and might enact other restrictions that effectively negate any benefit
to a noncitizen by a state’s refusal to participate in REAL ID. As such, a model that only looks
at restrictions, as in Chapter Three, or accommodations, as in Chapter Four, will not capture the
entire story of state policies concerning noncitizens. Consider that Boushey and Luedtke (2011)
find that Alabama and Michigan both enacted four control laws between 1997 and 2008. By this
measure they restrict immigration to a similar degree. However, during the same time period
Alabama enacted no integration policies, while Michigan enacted four integration policies.
These two states have significantly different stances on immigration, a complexity that is not
captured by two count variables alone. This Chapter will attempt to address this deficiency by
creating a new measure of state policy sentiment regarding noncitizens that captures both
restriction and accommodation enacted by the state. This is based upon the work of Márquez
and Schraufnagel (2013), where the authors create a restriction score for each state. I will revisit
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their work, using a new time period and a model that has been updated according to the findings
thus far.
This line of research is important for several reasons. As above, any legislation that
concerns immigration will touch upon issues of race and ethnicity. Because these issues are
complex, a model that simply counts the number of restrictions or accommodations a state
enacted, and the factors associated with each count, will fail to explain a large share of the
variance in how state legislatures regarded noncitizens during this period. Also, by taking both
restrictions and accommodations into account, this chapter will present a better picture of how
states control the flow of immigrants. It is possible that states prefer some immigrants over
others. For example, some states that passed restrictions also passed accommodations which
recognized the validity of medical, nursing, and even physical therapy degrees earned outside the
United States. And as also stated in the previous chapters, state policies concerning immigration
may affect total state population, which will in turn affect representation in Congress and the
Electoral College. Finally, in the 2016 presidential election and the beginning of the Trump
administration, immigration has emerged as a very salient issue. This chapter’s research will
expand our knowledge of how states treat noncitizens.
I have uncovered different factors in the enactment of restrictions and accommodations
for noncitizens. In Chapter Three I find that the count of restrictions enacted by a state is
associated with the growth of the foreign-born, Asian, and Latino population of a state, along
with some other factors which will be examined below. In Chapter Four I find that the count of
accommodations is associated with different variables depending on whether the size of the
foreign-born population, Asian population, or Latino population is used. Again, there were other
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factors which influenced the dependent variable. Also, one variable, urban percentage, was
associated with both accommodation and restriction. This chapter will look at both restrictions
and accommodations in the same model, with separate models for the state foreign-born, Asian,
and Latino populations, respectively. Table 5-1 below displays the breakdown of how many
restrictions and accommodations each state passed.
Table 5-1: Total Restrictions and Accommodations by State
STATE
RESTRICTIONS ACCOMMODATIONS
California
12
46
Virginia
18
14
Arizona
21
9
Utah
13
16
Illinois
8
16
Texas
11
12
Oklahoma
12
8
Florida
5
14
Tennessee
16
3
Georgia
16
3
Oregon
8
10
Colorado
6
11
Arkansas
9
7
Maryland
7
8
Alabama
12
3
Nebraska
10
3
Minnesota
5
8
Washington
4
8
Idaho
7
4
Louisiana
2
9
Kansas
3
7
Indiana
4
6
North Carolina
6
4
West Virginia
7
3
Connecticut
1
8
Maine
3
6
(Continued on the next page)

TOTAL
58
32
30
29
24
23
20
19
19
19
18
17
16
15
15
13
13
12
11
11
10
10
10
10
9
9
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Table 5-1 (continued)
STATE
Hawaii
Missouri
North Dakota
New York
Vermont
Rhode Island
New Mexico
Montana
New Hampshire
Nevada
Michigan
Mississippi
South Dakota
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
Iowa
Kentucky
Massachusetts
New Jersey
Wyoming
Ohio
Wisconsin
Alaska
Delaware
TOTALS

RESTRICTIONS
5
6
6
2
3
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
4
3
3
2
0
2
0
0
1
1
0
0
275

ACCOMMODATIONS
4
3
3
6
5
6
5
3
3
4
3
2
1
1
1
2
3
1
3
2
0
0
0
0
308

TOTAL
9
9
9
6
8
7
7
6
6
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
2
1
1
0
0
583

It is a challenge to draw any firm conclusions by simply looking at the data in Table 5-1.
Among the ten states that demonstrated the highest level of legislative intensity towards
noncitizens, there are both red and blue states, varying levels of legislative professionalism,
varying population sizes, and a geographic dispersion. Many states enacted a nearly identical
number of restrictions and accommodations. Others enacted many restrictions and few
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accommodations, or many accommodations and few restrictions. Two states, Alaska and
Delaware, did not enact any legislation towards noncitizens at all during the 2009 to 2014 period
under study, and this is not surprising given their relatively small populations. Despite this
seeming randomness, there are some conclusions which may be drawn. For instance, the Golden
State enacted 46 accommodations and 8 restrictions. California’s legislature was therefore both
very concerned with immigration, and generally tended to accommodate rather than restrict
noncitizens. Conversely, Virginia enacted 18 restrictions and 12 accommodations; from this I
conclude that the Old Dominion was likewise concerned about immigration, but overall tended
to restrict rather than accommodate noncitizens. A flaw in simply counting the number of
restrictions and accommodations is revealed by this example: one state enacted more restrictions
than 37 other states, and so it might seem to be one of the most restrictive states. Yet, that state,
California, also enacted 46 accommodations, more than the lowest 23 states put together.
Clearly, when taken out of context, some of the statistics reported in Table 5-1 could be very
misleading. In the following sections I attempt to quantify these tendencies and account for
differing amounts of legislative intensity towards immigration.
A New Measure of State Sentiment Regarding Noncitizens

Following Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013), this chapter will assign a score for each
state that is derived from its legislation regarding noncitizens during the period under study,
2009 to 2013. This score is intended to capture whether a state has tended to accommodate or
restrict noncitizens. Márquez and Schaufnagel called their measure the restrictive score, but I
will call mine the sentiment score in order to emphasize that sentiment towards noncitizens may
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be either positive or negative. Additionally, this chapter will expand the time period from 20092012 to 2009-2014. My goal is to learn more about what prompts a state posture towards
noncitizens. My sentiment score subtracts the number of restrictions from the number of
accommodations. Yet, in order to create a discrete measure that makes the choice of a statistical
model straightforward, I measure the difference between each state's accommodations and
restrictions as a ratio of the total number of bills enacted by each state. This is intended to
capture the intensity with which each state enacted new policies concerning noncitizens, in
addition to the direction which they tended to proceed. The sum of each state's accommodations
is divided by the total for all 50 states, and the sum of each state's restrictions is likewise divided
by the total for all of the states. The former is subtracted from the latter, and the result is the raw
score for that state. Because this results in some infinitesimally small values, the raw score is
multiplied by 1,000 to create whole numbers.
�

State # of accommodations
State # of restrictions
�−�
� ∗ 1000 = Sentiment Score
Total # of accommodations
Total # of restrictions

Much of the criticism that Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013) received centered on the

unconventional dependent variable. Because my dependent variable is a slightly modified
version of theirs, I will address some of that criticism. First, validity is always a problem when
trying to put a number on something as ethereal as sentiment. When we scored the states in
2013, we found that the results survived a test of face validity. The five most restricting states in
our 2013 study are Tennessee, Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, and Virginia. Four of these five fell
under the coverage formula of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, before that formula was struck
down by the Supreme Court in Shelby Co. v. Holder (2013). It is not surprising that states which
had been determined to be engaged in voting discrimination would also be states that restricted
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noncitizens. Likewise, the five most liberalizing states in our 2013 study are California, Illinois,
New York, Missouri, and Connecticut. Three of the five are among the six traditional gateway
states for immigrants described in Chapter Two, and this result is what one would probably
expect if asked to list the states that are pro-immigrant.
Also, there was criticism of the choice of quantitative tools used to measure the
relationship between variables. Both the 2013 paper and this chapter’s study will use an ordinary
least squares regression (OLS) to regress the dependent variable onto the independent variables.
One critic commented that the construction of the dependent variable negates the use of an OLS,
because the DV is ratio rather than a continuous string of numbers. Another way of putting this
is that the number of laws enacted terminates at a certain point. First, there is no mechanism that
prevents a state from enacting more and legislation concerning noncitizens. In theory, a state
could enact legislation continuously. Second, in the real word, every seemingly continuous
string of number stops at a certain point. For example, consider a study of public salaries at a
governmental entity. It would be perfectly appropriate to use an OLS regression to examine the
factors that are associated with employee salaries in a large organization. Yet, salaries do not
rise for infinity; there is a highest salary at which no other salary will exceed. Another constraint
on salaries in a public organization is the budget that has been adopted. I posit that it is just as
appropriate to use an OLS model with my dependent variable as it is to use one in a study about
salaries. Before turning to other criticisms, I will report the scores for each state below.

STATE
CA

Table 5-2: Sentiment Score by State
SENTIMENT
STATE
SCORE
112.23
MT
(continued on next page)

SENTIMENT
SCORE
-0.25
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Table 5-2 (continued)
STATE
LA
FL
CT
IL
RI
NY
WA
CO
KY
NV
NM
ME
WY
NJ
VT
IN
MN
OR
KS
MD
TX
UT
DE
MI

SENTIMENT
SCORE
32.19
28.69
22.56
18.64
16.09
12.77
12.60
12.34
9.62
9.62
9.53
9.45
6.47
6.38
6.21
6.12
5.95
5.78
2.97
2.63
2.29
1.94
0
-0.25

STATE
AK
OH
WI
IA
MS
HI
MA
PA
NC
ID
AR
SC
SD
NH
ND
WV
MO
OK
VA
NE
AL
GA
TN
AZ

SENTIMENT
SCORE
-3.32
-3.32
-3.32
-3.40
-3.49
-3.66
-6.73
-6.73
-6.98
-7.07
-7.24
-10.05
-10.05
-10.22
-10.22
-13.54
-16.86
-17.29
-17.81
-20.27
-30.15
-43.44
-43.44
-53.93

Table 5-2 displays the scores for the states, with a high score indicating that the state has
exhibited a more accommodating sentiment towards noncitizens, and a negative score indicating
that the state has tended to restrict noncitizens. Another criticism of Márquez and Schraufnagel
(2013) concerned the construction of the score itself. Their restrictive score, and the sentiment
score that I have constructed for this chapter, both represent a dramatic improvement over counts
of accommodations and restrictions. I have already described the limitations of simple counts in
illustrating a complete picture of a state’s stance towards noncitizens. This new measure
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accounts for both restrictions and accommodations. Consider this: California has the highest
sentiment towards noncitizens. This is not surprising considering that California enacted the
most accommodations from 2009 to 2014. By contrast, Virginia enacted 18 restrictions, which is
more than Tennessee's 16. Yet, Tennessee has been scored as having a lower sentiment towards
noncitizens. This is because Virginia also enacted 14 accommodations, while Tennessee enacted
only 2. Put another way, Tennessee enacted almost 90% as many restrictions as Virginia, but
only about 19% as many accommodations. Tennessee is therefore nearly as restrictive as
Virginia, but not as accommodating. Because of this, I argue that the sentiment score is more
effective at illustrating a state’s complete posture towards noncitizens than a simple count of
restrictions or accommodations enacted, because the sentiment score captures the weight of both
accommodations and restrictions within the same statistic, and ranks the states appropriately
according to their actions regarding noncitizens.
Demographic Explanations

This chapter will utilize many of the variables uncovered in Chapters Three and Four.
Rather than regurgitate what was covered those chapters, I will briefly describe each variable,
which direction I expect it to move, and why. First, both of the previous two chapters found that
state demographics are associated with the types of legislation enacted by a state. This follows
the findings of Boushey and Luedtke (2011); Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013); Ybarra,
Sanchez, and Sanchez (2016). An ethnic threat hypothesis is further supported by the findings of
Hood and Morris (1998) and Newman et al (2012), which are discussed in Chapter Three. Like
previous chapters, I will distinguish between the foreign-born population, the Asian population,
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and the Latino population. Again, I do this because the general public cannot tell through casual
contact whether an Asian or a Latino is a citizen or not.
H1A: There is an inverse relationship between the growth rate of the foreign-born
population and the sentiment score.
H1B: There is an inverse relationship between the growth rate of the Asian population
and the sentiment score.
H1C: There is an inverse relationship between the growth rate of the Latino population
and the sentiment score.
Similarly, in Chapter 4 I find that the demographic characteristics of the existing state
population can affect the types of legislation enacted by the state. I expect that the size of the
foreign-born, Asian, and Latino populations of a state will lead to more positive legislative
outcomes for immigrants, and will therefore be directly associated with my sentiment score.
This follows the research of Avery, Fine, and Márquez (2017), who find that a larger Latino
electorate reduces the count of restrictions enacted by the states. These findings in turn support
the work of other researchers discussed in Chapter 4 (Pedraza 2014, Rouse et al 2010, Branton
2007). As above, I will distinguish between the foreign-born, Asian, and Latino state
populations, respectively.
H2A: The size of the state’s foreign-born population in 2010 is directly associated with
the state’s sentiment score.
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H2B: The size of the state’s Asian population in 2010 is directly associated with the
state’s sentiment score.
H2C: The size of the state’s Latino population in 2010 is directly associated with the
state’s sentiment score.
Another demographic factor I will consider is the percentage of the state’s population
with a college degree. This variable was utilized in both Chapters Three and Four, but the
findings varied depending on other variables used. When the growth of the foreign-born or
Asian populations were used as independent variables, state college graduation rate was
associated with a count of restrictions enacted, but not when the Latino growth rate was used in
the model. Conversely, when the size of the state Latino population was used as an independent
variable, the college graduation rate was associated with accommodations. This model will use
both the growth rate and the size of these populations, so it is difficult to tell which direction this
variable will go. I will return to my original theory, which is that an educated population is less
likely to feel threatened by increased immigration.
H3: The percentage of the state’s population that has a college degree in 2010 is directly
associated with the sentiment score for the state.
Economic Explanations

In Chapter Three I find that the strength of a state’s economy is inversely associated with
a count of restrictions on noncitizens enacted by a state; that is, as a state’s GDP goes down, the
number of restrictions enacted goes up. This finding is consistent with recent scholarship
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regarding the link between economic anxiety and anti-immigration sentiment (Ybarra et al 2015;
Brader et al 2008; Barkin 2003; Citrin 1997). As in previous chapters, I will use the per capita
state GDP as a measure of the overall economic health of the state. Further, in Chapter Four I
find that per capita welfare spending is inversely associated with the number of accommodations
passed. Though this finding was contrary to what I expected, I will use state welfare spending
per capita as an explanatory variable here because it would make no sense to leave a significant
variable out. I expect per capita welfare spending to be inversely associated with the sentiment
score. Finally, state urban percentage was associated with a count of both restrictions and
accommodations. I suspect that, in reality, the urban percentage is associated with the total count
of immigration legislation, rather than a certain type of legislation. A variable that accounts for
both the amount of legislation enacted, and the type of legislation, should correct this problem. I
posit that a more urban population will support accommodation, as evidenced by the number of
sanctuary cities; while a more rural population will tend to restrict. This theory also corresponds
to the finding of Chapter Two, which showed that the Latino population grew the most in
southern, rural states.
H4: The per capita state GDP in 2010 is directly associated with the state’s sentiment
score.
H5: The state welfare spending per capita in 2010 is inversely associated with the state’s
sentiment score.
H6: The state urban percentage is directly associated with the states sentiment score.
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Political Explanations

As in both Chapters Three and Four, I will use Berry’s citizen ideology score as a
measure of liberal or conservative sentiment in the state. Again, the Berry score goes from
conservative to liberal. This variable was inversely associated with a count of restrictions
enacted by the states, meaning that more conservative states tended to enact more restrictions.
Therefore, I expect a higher Berry score to be directly associated with a higher sentiment score.
These findings are consistent with recent scholarship (Hajnal and Rivera 2014; Reich and Barth
2012; Jeong et al 2011). Additionally, the degree to which a state’s legislature is
professionalized is found to be associated with an increase in the number of accommodations
enacted in Chapter Four. This is consistent with Boushey and Luedtke (2011). I will again use
Squire’s (1992) score of legislative professionalism, in which a higher score indicates a more
professionalized legislature. I expect that the Squire score is directly associated with the
sentiment score.
H7: There is a direct relationship between the citizen ideology score and the sentiment
score.
H8: There is a direct relationship between the professionalization of a state’s legislature
and a state’s sentiment score.
Table 5-3: Descriptive Statistics Regarding State Immigration Sentiment
Sentiment Score

MEAN
-9.57

Stnd. Dev.
MIN. VALUE
22.23
-53.93 (AZ)
(continued on next page)

MAX. VALUE
112.23 (CA)
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Table 5-3 (continued)
Foreign Born
2010
% Growth
Foreign Born
Asian 2010
% Growth Asian
Latino 2010
% Growth Latino
% College
Graduates
GDP per capita
Welfare
Spending per
capita
Urban
percentage
Citizen Ideology
Legislative
Professionalism

MEAN

Stnd. Dev.

MIN. VALUE

MAX. VALUE

801,496

1,659,908

15,843 (WY)

10,150,429 (CA)

43.35

20.18

11.1 (NY)

92.1 (AL)

293,063
55.47
1,008,457
72.46

712,836
20.09
2,401,111
30.12

4,426 (WY)
4.21 (HI)
9,208 (VT)
19.16 (NY)

4,861,007 (CA)
116.51 (NV)
14,013,719 (CA)
147.89 (SC)

53.46

9.20

23.4 (AK)

68.1 (MA)

46,238.58

8,541.26

32,967 (MS)

69,667 (DE)

1508.10

401.56

812.28 (MS)

2527.89 (DE)

79.59

14.56

38.7 (ME)

95 (CA)

48.08

8.81

30.2 (UT)

63.2 (VT)

0.18

0.12

0.03 (NH)

0.63 (NV)

Table 5-3 above displays some descriptive statistics regarding the sentiment score and the
factors suggested by the literature and previous findings in this dissertation. Many variables are
carried over from previous chapters, and I will respect the reader’s time by omitting a repeat of
my analysis from Chapters Three and Four. California has the highest sentiment score, and also
has the highest concentration of the foreign-born, Asians, and Latinos. This supports my
hypothesis that a state’s demographics affect its policies towards noncitizens. Georgia has the
lowest score, and I discussed this in an earlier section of this chapter.
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Results

Following Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013), I will regress my sentiment score,
calculated in the manner described above, onto the independent variables using an OLS.
Márquez and Schraufnagel found that some of the independent variables, which are also
employed here, were collinear, which would violate the assumption of no perfect
multicollinearity. Yet, when I run a correlation table, I find that none of the variables in these
three models are correlated at p < .10. Also, regardless of which demographic variables were
used, none of the variables had a VIF score above three. When the foreign-born statistics are
used, the mean VIF is 2.01; when the Asian population statistics are used, the mean VIF is 2.00;
and when the Latino population statistics are used, the mean VIF is 2.02. Hence, I conclude that
the assumption of no perfect multicollinearity remains in place. However, because this data is
cross-sectional, there is a substantial risk of heteroskedasticity (Gujarati 2003, 401). When I run
the Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity with the null hypothesis that variance is constant, I
find that can reject null at p < .05 for each test. Therefore, following Márquez and Schraufnagel,
I report robust standard errors (s.e.). I do not anticipate an autocorrelation problem because I am
not using time series data. The results are reported in Tables 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6 below.
Table 5-4: Foreign-Born Influence on the Sentiment Score
Expected Sign
Model A Coefficient (s.e.)
Demographic Explanations
Foreign-born growth rate
-.17 (.13)
Foreign-born population in 2010
+
.00001 (2.74)***
% college graduates
+
-.18 (.28)
(continued on next page)
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Table 5-4 (continued)
Economic Explanations
State GDP per capita
State welfare spending per capita
Urban percentage
Political Explanations
Citizen ideology
Squire score

Expected Sign

Model A Coefficient (s.e.)

+
+

.0004 (.0002)
-.001 (.007)
-.17 (.23)

+
+

.54 (.36)†
-30.87 (25.63)

Constant
F-statistic (8, 41)
Adjusted R2
n

-14.96
3.53***
.51
50
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15

Table 5-4 displays the results of the model when foreign-born growth rate and foreignborn population are used as the key demographic variables. The size of the foreign-born
population in 2010 is directly associated with the sentiment score at p < .01, suggesting that
states with a larger foreign-born population are friendlier to noncitizens than states with a lower
foreign-born population. This in turn shows that the foreign-born have some political sway and
may look out for noncitizens. Citizen ideology is directly associated with the sentiment score at
p < .15, suggesting that liberal citizens have a higher regard for noncitizens. The foreign-born
population growth does not reach the specified level of significance, though it comes close at p <
.20, and it moves in the predicted direction. In this analysis, a state’s sentiment appears strongly
related to its existing demographic, in this case the foreign-born population, and weakly
associated with citizen ideology. Many of the findings from Chapters Three and Four do not
hold up. Indeed, three variables move in the opposite direction predicted by theory: college
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graduate percentage, urban percentage, and Squire score. Before I speculate why these variables
did not perform as expected, I will first examine how they perform when this demographic group
is exchanged for others.
Table 5-5: Asian Influence on the Sentiment Score
Expected Sign
Model A Coefficient (s.e.)
Demographic Explanations
Asian growth rate
-.27 (.18)
Asian population in 2010
+
.00002 (3.29)***
% college graduates
+
-.15 (.36)
Economic Explanations
State GDP per capita
State welfare spending per capita
Urban percentage

+
+

.0003 (.0003)
-.001 (.007)
-.009 (.19)

Political Explanations
Citizen ideology
Squire score

+
+

.49 (.45)
-50.31 (24.93)**

Constant
F-statistic (8, 41)
Adjusted R2
n

-13.49
13.01***
.57
50
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15

Table 5-5 displays the results of the model when the foreign-born population statistics are
switched for Asian population growth and 2010 Asian population. The state’s Asian population,
like the state’s foreign-born population, is directly associated with the sentiment score at p < .01.
As above, I posit that Asian citizens are able to exert some political influence, and are
sympathetic to noncitizens. The only other significant variable is the Squire score, which is
inversely associated with my sentiment score at p < .10. This contradicts my theory, derived
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from Squire (1992), that a more diverse legislature is more receptive to noncitizens. Perhaps
full-time legislatures are more productive, and so the influence of a few restrictive states with
professionalized legislatures is skewing the results.
Table 5-6: Latino Influence on the Sentiment Score
Expected Sign
Model A Coefficient (s.e.)
Demographic Explanations
Latino growth rate
-.12 (.10)
Latino population in 2010
+
5.46 (2.63)**
% college graduates
+
-.05 (.30)
Economic Explanations
State GDP per capita
State welfare spending per capita
Urban percentage

+
+

.0003 (.0003)
-.001 (.006)
-.22 (.24)

Political Explanations
Citizen ideology
Squire score

+
+

.59 (.38)†
-2.78 (33.20)

Constant
F-statistic (8, 41)
Adjusted R2
n

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15

-21.61
2.93**
.47
50

Table 5-5 displays the results of the model when Latino population growth and Latino
population in 2010 were used as the key explanatory variables. As in the previous two tests, the
state’s 2010 Latino population is directly associated with the sentiment score. These three tests
seem to indicate that the demographics of a state will sway the state’s public policies concerning
noncitizens. In Table 5-5, the only other variable that is statistically significant is citizen
ideology at p < .15. A more liberal state citizenry tends to result in a higher sentiment score, as
was the case when the foreign-born population was used as the key demographic variable; this is
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not surprising given the high correlation between foreign-born and Latino population. In this
test, the Squire score has lost its significance as a predictor of state sentiment towards
noncitizens.
Analysis

On the whole, the sentiment score underperforms the restrictive score that it was meant to
improve upon. Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013) only tested using Hispanic growth rate and
size of Hispanic population, so only the third test is directly comparable (I use “Latino” here).
Even so, in their study, they find that the Hispanic growth rate is associated with restriction of
immigration at p < .05, and that the Squire score is associated with liberalization of immigration
at p < .05. In this study, I find no relationship between the Latino growth rate and state
sentiment towards noncitizens, and I find that legislative professionalism moves in the opposite
direction as the previous study. Márquez and Schraufnagel employ nearly identical variables as
this chapter with four exceptions: they omit state per capita welfare spending and urban
percentage, they replace citizen ideology with a variable of their own invention, and they include
the state unionization rate. Their “Democratic state government” variable measures the extent to
which a state’s government was controlled by Democrats in 2010. I argue that citizen ideology is
more reliable because of the sudden changes in state government that can occur within the five
years of this test. I have mentioned my reasoning for not employing unionization rate as a factor
in my analysis, but I will repeat it here: unionized employees are only about 11 percent of wage
earners in the U.S., and half of union members are public employees. Public employees may see
noncitizens as job security because noncitizens use the public services that public employees
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provide: schools, jails, clinics, etc. Also, unions tend to be strongest in socially liberal states, so
including unionization in a model that includes citizen ideology may lead to a multicollinearity
problem.
One likely possibility for the failure is that the states changed their behavior during the
expanded time period in this study. Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013) examine the period from
January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012. This chapter covers the period from January 1, 2009 to
December 31, 2014. The difference may not seem that great, but an analysis of the count of
restrictions and accommodations during that period is very revealing. From January 1, 2009 to
December 31, 2014 (the frame of this chapter’s study), the states enacted 275 restrictions and
308 accommodations. Yet, from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2011, the states enacted 206
restrictions to 181 accommodations. This means that from January 1, 2012 to December 31,
2014, the states enacted 69 restrictions and 127 accommodations. Clearly, the ratio of
restrictions to accommodations altered course in 2012. There are probably several reasons for
this. First, it is natural to expect a backlash as the conflict becomes socialized and supporters of
immigration mobilize to confront the groups that pushed for omnibus laws like Arizona’s
SB1070 (Schattschneider 1960). Another possibility is that the dynamics of the 2012
presidential campaign altered the tone of the immigration debate. Additionally, in Chapter Three
I mentioned two federal court cases where courts ruled that state omnibus bills enacted in
Arizona and Alabama were partially preempted by federal law. This probably contributed to the
sudden change in state policy activity towards noncitizens by signaling to the states that there
was a limit to how much they could restrict noncitizens. Utah, for example, enacted a number of
exclusionary policies, including their own omnibus bill similar to Arizona’s; yet, Utah also
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passed their own version of the DREAM Act, and other inclusionary measures. Paul Jacobs,
Elizabeth Keister, Christy Glass, and Peggy Petrzelka (2015) find that Utah changed its behavior
towards noncitizens as a result of debate within the state legislature regarding immigration.
Because the sentiment score is a function of the ratio of accommodations to restrictions,
any sudden alteration in the behavior of the states may cause the slope to be nonconstant. This
means that, when all other independent variables are held constant, the change in the dependent
variable associated with a change in one independent variable will not be fixed (Berry 1993, 5).
Put another way, the estimates produced by this model will no longer be BLUE, because this
model violates the assumption of linearity, which is what the “L” stands for. What is the best
way to deal with this problem? A common method is to transform the nonlinear variable, which
in this case is the dependent variable. This often takes the form of a logarithmic transformation
or a square root. Yet, I reject these methods because of the effect they would have on the
dependent variable. The sentiment score is designed to indicate that some states have a positive
sentiment and some have a negative sentiment. Either of the transformations listed would
eliminate the negative sign and change the rankings of the states. Another possibility is to
introduce a dummy variable at the point where the states shift from enacting a high ratio of
restrictions to accommodations to a high ratio of accommodations to restrictions. This is
problematic for two reasons. First, to identify the exact moment when this shift occurred would
be impossible. Second, the sentiment score is constructed from a sum total of restrictions and
accommodations over a selected period of time; this precludes the insertion of a dummy variable
that represents a “before” and “after” into the model because the model does not use time series
data.
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Does State Sentiment Shift Over Time?
The solution that I propose is to simply select different periods. It is clear that three years
from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2011 are a distinct period, when states tended to restrict
more than they accommodated noncitizens, 206 restrictions to 181 accommodations. I will
create a new sentiment score for those three years. For the sake of symmetry, I will also create a
new sentiment score for the three years following: January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014. I will
run the model using the two new scores as the dependent variables. All other variables from
above will carry over, and so will all of the descriptive statistics except for the scores themselves.
For that reason, I will not create a second descriptive statistics table. Again, I will use the
foreign-born, Asian, and Latinos in separate tests to avoid the multicollinearity problem. The
new scores are reported in Table 5-7 below.

STATE
California
Louisiana
Maryland
Florida
New Mexico
Rhode Island
Kansas
Illinois
Texas
New York
Kentucky
Washington

Table 5-7: Revised State Sentiment Scores
2009-2011 SCORE
STATE
48.82
California
28.5
Connecticut
26.68
Louisiana
23.65
Maine
20.62
Illinois
20.62
Washington
15.76
Colorado
15.45
Hawaii
15.15
Florida
14.25
Nevada
12.73
Rhode Island
12.42
Indiana
(Continued on next page)

2012-2014 SCORE
175.64
40
40
26.66
22.72
20
19.59
16.46
16.05
13.33
13.33
9.79
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Table 5-7 (continued)
STATE

Utah
New Hampshire
Connecticut
Nevada
Colorado
Massachusetts
New Jersey
Wyoming
Minnesota
Oregon
Indiana
Vermont
Pennsylvania
Idaho
Arkansas
Delaware
Ohio
Missouri
North Dakota
Maine
Montana
Mississippi
Wisconsin
North Carolina
South Dakota
Virginia
Iowa
Michigan
West Virginia
South Carolina
Oklahoma
Arkansas
Hawaii
Alabama

2009-2011 SCORE
STATE
10.29
Michigan
9.39
Nebraska
7.88
New York
7.88
Vermont
7.57
Iowa
6.36
Montana
6.36
Wyoming
6.36
Minnesota
6.06
Kentucky
6.06
New Jersey
4.54
Texas
3.03
Arkansas
1.51
Delaware
1.2
Wisconsin
0
Oregon
0
Utah
0
Mississippi
-0.3
New Mexico
-0.3
South Carolina
-1.82
North Carolina
-1.82
Oklahoma
-3.33
Alaska
-4.85
Kansas
-6.67
Ohio
-8.19
South Dakota
-8.81
Idaho
-9.7
West Virginia
-9.7
Maryland
-11.53
North Dakota
-14.56
Pennsylvania
-15.18
Alabama
-16.38
Tennessee
-19.41
Massachusetts
-32.46
Virginia
(Continued on next page)

2012-2014 SCORE
9.79
9.79
9.79
9.79
6.66
6.66
6.66
6.25
3.12
3.12
3.12
2.72
0
0
-0.81
-0.81
-3.53
-3.53
-3.53
-7.07
-7.07
-10.2
-10.2
-10.2
-10.2
-13.74
-13.74
-20.4
-20.4
-20.4
-27.48
-27.48
-30.6
-34.96
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Table 5-7 (continued)
STATE
Nebraska
Arizona
Georgia
Tennessee

2009-2011 SCORE
-37.31
-37.93
-47.02
-51.88

STATE
Missouri
New Hampshire
Georgia
Arizona

2012-2014 SCORE
-40.8
-40.8
-54.55
-78.5

Table 5-7 displays the new scores for both time periods. California remains the state with
the highest sentiment towards noncitizens. In the 2009-2011 period, Tennessee had the lowest
sentiment towards noncitizens, and in the 2012-2014 period it was Arizona that scored the
lowest. There are some interesting developments to note. Six of the ten highest scoring states do
not carry over into the second period, and one of them, Hawaii, is suddenly one of the ten most
restrictive states in the 2012-2014 period. Five of the ten most restrictive states do not carry over
into the bottom ten in the second period, but none of them appear among the ten that
accommodate noncitizens the most. Interestingly, Pennsylvania shows up among the most
restrictive states in 2012 to 2014; this state defied the polls and sealed Trump’s victory in 2016.
I think much of the change occurs due to shifting policy activity: after dealing with immigration,
many states with smaller noncitizen populations move on to other matters. Alternatively,
migration and population growth are ongoing throughout the decade, and nearly half of the
change that will be measured in the 2020 Census will have taken place by the end of 2014. It's
possible that growth of noncitizens declines after restrictions are enacted. The New York Times
reports that Latinos fled Alabama after it enacted a harsh omnibus bill. 1 Several states in the
0F

www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/us/after-ruling-hispanics-flee-an-alabama-town.html (Accessed
August 10, 2016.)
1
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middle appear to have very little policy activity towards noncitizens. For example, five states
end up with scores of 9.79 simply because they enacted three accommodations and one
restriction. The appearance of low policy activity is a consequence of splitting one dataset in
half, as there are now fewer observations to go around. Despite this, the states remain the units
of analysis with an n of 50.

Table 5-8: Foreign-born Influence on State Sentiment
Expected Sign
2009-11 (s.e.)

Demographic
Explanations
Foreign-born growth
rate
Foreign-born
population in 2010
% college graduates

Economic
Explanations
State GDP per capita
State welfare spending
per capita
Urban percentage
Political Explanations
Citizen ideology
Squire score
Constant
F-statistic (8, 41)
Adjusted R2
n

2012-2014 (s.e.)

-

-.25 (.14)*

-.10 (.17)

+

6.19 (1.31)***

.00001 (4.58)***

+

.15 (.33)

-.56 (.45)

+

.0001 (.0002)

.0007 (.0004)†

-

.008 (.006)

-.01 (.01)

+

.24 (.17)

-.65 (.40)†

+
+

.05 (.43)
-59.59 (19.73)***

.91 (.56)†
.73 (47.15)

-30.31
6.31
.36
50
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15

11.23
2.36**
.47
50
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Table 5-8 displays the results of the tests when foreign born growth and population are
the key explanatory variables. For the 2009-2011 period, the growth of the foreign-born
population from 2001-2010 is inversely associated with the sentiment score at p < .05, which
suggests that a state’s sentiment towards noncitizens goes down as its foreign-born population
grows. Put another way, from 2009 to 2011, the states that tended to enact the most restrictions
on noncitizens were ones that saw the highest growth rate of their foreign-born population. This
supports the findings of Boushey and Luedtke (2011). Yet, this finding does not carry over into
the 2012 to 2014 dataset. This might be due to the factors stated above, especially the changing
pattern of migration through the decade. The size of the foreign-born population remains
associated with a higher sentiment in both periods. Notably, the Squire score is significant at p <
.05 from 2009 to 2011, but not significant at all from 2012 to 2014. This may be due to a period
of intense activity by a relatively small number of states with professionalized legislatures in the
first period. Through both periods, the size of the foreign-born population is directly associated
with state sentiment towards immigration at p < .01. In the later period, per capita GDP is
associated with a more accommodating sentiment, as predicted; while urban percentage is
associated with more restrictive sentiment, defying prediction.

Demographic
Explanations
Asian growth rate
Asian population in
2010
% college graduates

Table 5-9: Asian Influence on State Sentiment
Expected Sign
2009-11 (s.e.)

2012-2014 (s.e.)

-

-.13 (.18)

-.53 (.22)**

+

.00001 (2.41)***

.00003 (5.33)***

+
.11 (.38)
(Table continued on next page)

-.46 (.49)
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Table 5-9 (continued)
Expected Sign

2009-11 (s.e.)

+

.0001 (.0002)

.0007 (.0004)*

-

.009 (.007)

-.01 (.01)

+

.35 (.16)**

-.45 (.27)†

Political Explanations
Citizen ideology

+

.15 (.50)

.71 (.54)

Demographic
Explanations
Squire score

+

-55.95 (23.10)

-51.54 (40.28)

Economic
Explanations
State GDP per capita
State welfare spending
per capita
Urban percentage

Constant
F-statistic (8, 41)
Adjusted R2
n

-45.84
15.90***
.30
50
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15

38.77
12.70
.63
50

Table 5-9 displays the results of the test when Asian growth rate and population are used
as the explanatory variables. In contrast to the foreign-born growth rate statistic in Table 5-6,
here the Asian growth rate is not a statistically significant predictor of restrictive sentiment on
the part of the state during the 2009-2011 period. This finding is important because growth rate
was a statistically significant factor in restriction when the population in question was foreignborn rather than Asian. Oddly, in the 2012-2014 time frame, Asian population growth was
associated with a lower sentiment score at p < .05. I posit that this behavior occurs because of
the dynamics of policy diffusion among the American states. After an initial burst of
restrictions, the federal courts set some boundaries for the states, and the other states copied
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successful policies. Recall that the Asian population growth rate was associated with the total
population growth rate. The behavior of the Asian growth rate variable in the second time period
suggests that the other states were catching up. Of the other variables, the urban percentage is
associated with a more positive sentiment in the early time frame, but with restriction in the later
time frame.

Demographic
Explanations
Latino growth rate
Latino population in
2010
% college graduates

Table 5-10: Latino Influence on State Sentiment
Expected Sign
2009-11 (s.e.)

Economic
Explanations
State GDP per capita
State welfare spending
per capita
Urban percentage
Political Explanations
Citizen ideology
Squire score
Constant
F-statistic (8, 41)
Adjusted R2
N

2012-2014 (s.e.)

-

-.18 (.12)†

-.074 (.12)

+

3.21 (1.07)***

8.05 (3.96)**

+

.28 (.35)

-.42 (.47)

+

.00006 (.0002)

.0008 (.0004)†

-

.009 (.005)†

-.01 (.01)

+

.15 (.19)

-.67 (.40)*

+
+

.11 (.46)
-44.52 (16.52)***

.97 (.57)*
35.92 (55.27)

-30.52
4.72***
.35
50
*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15

-2.01
2.06*
.45
50

Table 5-10 displays the results of the model when Latino population growth and 2010
Latino population are used as the key explanatory variables. Latino growth is a predictor of
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restrictive sentiment at p < .15, and the size of the Latino population in 2010 is associated with
accommodation at p < .05. These findings are similar to the foreign-born growth and population
size statistics reported above, and this is not surprising given the high correlation between the
Latino population statistic and foreign-born statistic that was uncovered in Chapter Two. The
2009 to 2011 results support the findings of Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013). Yet, the
statistical association is weaker when Latino population growth is used rather than foreign-born
population growth. This may indicate a flaw with one of my assumptions: that voters are unable
to tell through casual contact whether a Latino is a citizen or not. There Latino statistic covers
diverse group. It includes Puerto Ricans, who are U.S. citizens at birth; and Cubans, who were
rapidly granted lawful permanent residency under the wet foot, dry foot policy in place during
the period under study. Also, in the early period, a state’s legislative professionalism is inversely
associated with the state’s sentiment towards noncitizens. However, the picture changes in the
2012-2014 period. Here, Latino population growth is not associated with the dependent variable
at any specified level. The size of the Latino population is directly associated with state
sentiment at only p < .10. The Squire score is no longer significant. Instead, citizen ideology is
directly associate with state sentiment at p < .15.
It is now clear that many of the states changed their behavior towards noncitizens over
time. This does not imply that the work of previous scholars is somehow deficient. Boushey
and Luedtke (2011) present a model of state behavior from 1997 to 2008, while Márquez and
Schraufnagel (2013) present a model of state behavior from 2008 to 2012. After splitting the
dataset in half, this chapter confirms these findings regarding the earlier period of restriction.
Put another way, several factors which explain state policymaking towards noncitizens in one
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period, 2009 to 2011, do not hold sway in another, 2012-2014. This might be explained by the
mechanics of policy diffusion. After a few states like Arizona, Tennessee, and Alabama set the
standard for restrictive legislation, other states may have followed their example. Although no
omnibus bills were passed after Arizona v. United States (2012), other types of legislation that
withstood judicial scrutiny may have spread among the states. Also possible is that policy
entrepreneurs who push for restrictions on noncitizens branched out into other states after their
initial success in states like Arizona and Alabama. Another interesting result is the behavior of
the urban percentage variable, which ends up being associated with restriction in later time
frame, but is associated with accommodation in the early time period when the Asian
demographic statistics are employed. I suspect that, as mentioned in Chapter Four, the urban
percentage statistic may be related to legislative attention rather than sentiment. The dependent
variable used here is not based on a count, but rather a relationship between two types of
activities: accommodation and restriction. The change in direction in this chapter’s results may
also be caused by having only a few observations on some states. Additionally, the passage of
time affects the accuracy of the cross-sectional measures I have used in this dissertation. By the
end of 2014, nearly half of all changes between the 2010 Census and the 2020 Census will have
occurred. Further, the politics of the states can change rapidly. Many states during this period
switched from Republican governors to Democratic governors, and vice versa. For example,
California enacted more and more accommodations after a Republican governor left office in
2010. This analysis omits vetoed legislation to concentrate on enacted legislation, and that
coding decision may explain spurts of policy action or inaction. Finally, both scores are skewed
by the fact that in both time periods there were an active handful of states, while other states
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enacted relatively few immigration laws. This problem is compounded when I split the dataset
in half. I attempted to increase the number of observations on the states by adding 2014, but
many states end up with three or fewer pieces of legislation enacted regarding noncitizens in a
three-year period. Of course, it is difficult to draw conclusions based on two or three pieces of
legislation.
Conclusion

This chapter has updated research by Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013) regarding state
legislative attention to noncitizens by attempting to create a new sentiment score using an
expanded sample. The sentiment score does a good job of distinguishing between states that
enact a lot of legislation regarding noncitizens, and states that move in a firm direction to restrict
or accommodate. However, I was unable to replicate previous findings of scholars who have
studied this phenomenon. I find that in aggregate terms, the states changed their behavior
regarding noncitizens midway through the time period under study, 2009 to 2014. The ratio of
restrictions to accommodations shifted during 2012; because the sentiment score is based in part
on that ratio, the assumption of linearity is no longer valid. I solve this problem by splitting the
dataset in two and devise a new sentiment score for 2009 to 2011 and 2012 to 2014, respectively.
This results in findings that confirm previous research by Boushey and Luedtke (2011) and
Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013). Restriction during the 2009-2011 is associated with the
growth of the foreign-born and/or Latino population, while accommodation is associated with
the size of the existing foreign-born, Asian, and/or Latino population. The Squire score for
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legislative professionalism is inversely associated with sentiment regardless of the population
variables used, but this defies expectations.
There are many avenues for future research. First, why did state sentiment change in
2012? There were federal court rulings that struck down portions of Arizona’s and Alabama’s
omnibus laws. There was also the presidential election of 2012, and states may have looked to
that election for cues on how to proceed on immigration. And there may have a been a backlash
against advocates for restriction by advocates for accommodations. Another contending
explanation for the observed instability in states immigration legislation is the tendency of media
attention to “lurch” from one topic to another, as described by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan
D. Jones (2009). This “lurching” may explain the peaks and valleys in Figure 1-1. One possible
means to improve the sentiment score is to expand the datasets by one year on each side, so that
there is a 2008 to 2011 score and a 2012 to 2015 score. This would increase the observations for
most states. A problem here is that the 2010 data point for many variables would become less
and less accurate. A solution would be to choose different variables or to choose different data
points. The earlier time period could use the 2010 Census data, while the second could rely on
the American Community Survey from 2011 to 2015. However, if different explanatory
variables are used, there could be doubts about whether the same phenomenon is being
examined. Finally, the Squire score was inversely associated with accommodations in Chapter
Four and is inversely associated with sentiment here. These results are surprising because
professionalized legislatures tend to be more diverse than less professionalized ones. Further
research could uncover why this is the case.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

Clearly there was an ebb and flow to the restrictions and accommodations enacted by the
states. All restrictive omnibus legislation was enacted before the end of 2012, when the Supreme
Court ruled that some provisions of Arizona’s SB1070 were preempted by federal law; a lower
court also ruled that many provisions of Alabama’s omnibus bill were likewise preempted.
Conversely, most state versions of the DREAM Act were passed after the failure of Congress to
pass the original DREAM Act in 2010. In Chapter Five I point out that the states tended to pass
more restrictions than accommodations before 2012, and more accommodations than restrictions
from 2012 onward. These facts suggest that states took their lead from the federal government,
halting restriction at the line drawn by federal courts or picking up the slack where Congress fell
short. This is consistent with some of the literature on new federalism and political regimes that
I discuss in Chapter One. Now that the Republican Party has control over both the White House
and Congress, it will be interesting to see which direction the states will go: in the aggregate, will
they now tend to restrict, as they did up until 2012; or to accommodate, as they have done since
2012? Given that Donald Trump and much of the Republican Party favor restriction, the
direction that individual states proceed will signal how the population of each state feels about
people who are not U.S. citizens.
Returning to the issue of new federalism, there is literature which suggests that states
may support or defy the administration according to intrastate factors, such as partisanship.
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Recently, Texas enacted a law making it illegal for general governments within the state to enact
sanctuary policies, wherein a governmental entity refuses to comply with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainers (Barragán 2017). This action lends support to the findings
of Jeffrey R. Lax and Justin H. Phillips (2012) that states are engaging in policy activism in an
increasingly wider range of issues. Likewise, California became the first state to pass a
statewide sanctuary bill (Lazo 2017). That California would go out of its way to accommodate
noncitizens is not surprising to anyone who has read Chapters Four and Five. This sort of policy
activism is a perfect example of what Lori Riverstone-Newell (2012) dubbed “bottom-up
activism;” that is, the state of California is setting a new standard for accommodation, while the
Trump administration is pushing for more restriction. In effect, Texas probably feels
emboldened to innovate in restriction by the electoral success of Trump, while California is
signally that it is part of the “resistance” to the Trump administration.
It should be noted that although Latinos and Asians make up three-quarters of the
foreign-born, opposition to immigration is not necessarily evidence of bigotry. If the estimated
eleven million unauthorized noncitizens were granted citizenship tomorrow, what would happen
to wages in workplaces that aren’t protected by collective bargaining agreements? What would
job prospects look like for workers who lack a college education? People who oppose
immigration may have valid economic concerns, and it is short-sighted to simply call Trump
voters racist. Having said that, the fact that so many immigrants since 1965 were members of
racial and ethnic minority groups means that an ethnic threat theory cannot be discounted out of
hand. The uneven settlement of noncitizens in the last decade, combined with the unique system
of federalism, single-member districts, and the Electoral College, is a circumstance that defied a
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common solution. Hence, this study, which examines state entry into America’s struggle with
immigration policy.
A Federal Approach to Immigration Policy

I will now summarize all findings thus far. Chapter One briefly traced the history of
localized opposition to the immigration or migration of Chinese, African Americans, Japanese,
and Latinos since the Fourteenth Amendment. All the above groups faced some form of
discrimination when their numbers grew in certain areas, or, in the case of the Japanese, when a
national tragedy occurred. Yet, the manner of government action taken against these groups
depended on circumstances at the national level. I use Stephen Skowronek’s theory of political
time to explain the variation in how national, state, and local governments acted. Periods of
direct, national action took place during political regimes, when one side clearly had control of
the national government. In these periods the Chinese Exclusion Act was enacted, Japanese
citizens on the west coast were sent to internment camps, and the Eisenhower administration
carried out “Operation Wetback.” During disjunctive periods, however, the national government
was unable to act in a manner that preempted state and local policies; during these periods,
African Americans were lynched and segregated in northern cities, and states acted to restrict
noncitizens. Time will tell if Trump is a reconstructive president who leads a new conservative
regime under the GOP, or if we are in a post-regime era defined by polarization and wild swings
in control of government.
In Chapter Two, I attempt to uncover factors which explain the growth of the Asian and
Latino populations in the American states. I find that, contrary to my chain migration
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assumption, the Asian population of the states followed total population growth. Put another
way, the states with a higher total population growth rate tended to have a higher Asian
population growth rate, after controlling for other factors suggested by theory. Conversely, state
Latino population growth occurred in a nonrandom manner. Latino population growth tended to
be lowest in states with a large number of Latinos already residing, and tended to be higher in
rural states and states that were part of the Confederacy. This lead to the question of what
southern states have in common which tended to draw Latinos. Instead of a dummy variable that
indicates whether a state was part of the Confederacy, there is a cluster of southern attributes
which can be used. These include urban percentage (which is inversely correlated to the South
dummy variable), temperature, unionization rates (also inversely correlated), and the relative size
of the African American population. I find that when I use these variables in place of the South
dummy variable, state Latino population growth is directly associated with the African American
percentage of the state’s population and total population growth, and inversely associated with
the urban percentage and the size of the existing Latino population. The fact that the Latino
population grew so rapidly in the southern states has political implications covered in subsequent
chapters. This also has economic and social consequences for the African American populations
of these states, but that is outside the scope of this study.
In Chapter Three I attempt to uncover the factors related to the enactment of restrictions
on noncitizens at the state level. The literature suggests both an economic threat and an ethnic
threat. Because my dependent variable is a count of state laws enacted, I use a Poisson
regression. I separately test the foreign-born growth rate, Asian growth rate, and Latino growth
rate for their respective influence on the dependent variable. Each demographic variable is
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directly associated with restriction, as is urban percentage. State per capita GDP and citizen
ideology are inversely associated with restriction. The percent of the state’s population that
possesses a college degree is associated with restriction when the foreign-born and Asian growth
rates are used, but not when the Latino growth rate is used. This may be due to the smaller
numbers of the Latino population with college degrees. Overall, the results support both
economic threat and ethnic threat explanation for state restrictions on noncitizens.
In Chapter Four I attempt to uncover the factors related to the enactment of
accommodations on noncitizens at the state level. There is literature to suggest that group
identity and group cohesiveness may lead naturalized immigrants, Asian Americans, and Latino
citizens to influence government to accommodate noncitizens. There also literature which
suggests other factors, including education level, economic strength, and ideology. Because my
dependent variable is a count of state laws enacted, I use a Poisson regression. I separately test
the state foreign-born population, Asian population, and Latino population in 2010. I find that
the population statistic is associated with the dependent variable regardless of whether foreignborn, Asian, or Latino is used. Further, the state Squire score and urban percentage are
consistently associated with the dependent variable. Other variables associated with
accommodation are the urban percentage and the Squire score. State per capita welfare spending
is inversely associated with accommodation when the state Asian or Latino population are used
as independent variables. The urban percentage is interesting because it is associated with both
restriction and accommodation. In reality, urban is probably associated with legislative intensity
towards immigration. In Chapter Five, where the dependent variable is no longer a count of laws
enacted, urban percentage is no longer statistically significant.
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In Chapter Five I attempt to capture a state’s comprehensive posture on immigration for
the period 2009 to 2014. I argue that a count of restrictions and accommodations is insufficient,
because states could have an equal number of one but not the other. To accomplish this, I
construct a new dependent variable, based on the work of Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013).
This new statistic uses both the accommodations and restrictions enacted by a state as a function
of the total number of accommodations and restrictions enacted by the American states. The
score produced successfully ranks each state in terms of their sentiment towards noncitizens.
States with a high number of both restrictions and accommodations are differentiated from and
ranked higher than states with a high number of restrictions but fewer accommodations.
However, the independent variables used by Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013) and other authors
are not found to be statistically significant. After further analysis, I find that the states shifted
from a mostly restrictive stance between 2009 and 2011, and a mostly accommodating one
between 2012 and 2014. Hence, the findings of Boushey and Luedtke (2011), Márquez and
Schraufnagel (2013), and Ybarra et al (2015) are timebound, and only appear to hold up during a
period from about 2005 to 2012. In both periods, the state foreign-born, Asian, and Latino
populations are associated with accommodation. In the 2009 to 2011 period, the growth rates of
the foreign-born and Latino populations are both associated with restriction, while the Squire
score of legislative professionalism is associated with accommodation.
Future Research Possibilities

The findings uncovered thus far point to many interesting research possibilities in the
future. In Chapter Two I find that the Latino population growth from 2001 to 2010 was strongly
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associated with the percent of a state’s population that is African American. One question which
begs to be answered is, how did African American state legislators react to the Latino growth
rate, particularly in the South? To measure this, it would be necessary to designate a group of
laws that are clearly restrictive in intent, gather data regarding the composition of state
legislatures in the South, and observe whether African American legislators voted yea or nay.
The United States is not the only nation where nativism is making a comeback. Nativist
political parties have gained support in Poland, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Hungary,
Austria, and other nations. The research methodology employed here could be used elsewhere.
Is the rise of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) tied to the growth rate of a certain population in
Germany? Is the increase in support for the Front National (FN) in France likewise tied to the
growth rate of some particular group? What factors explain the electoral success of Sabastian
Kurz and the OeVP in Austria? Studying Europe in such a way would allow for the use of Mill’s
Method of Difference, or a most-similar systems design (George and Bennett 2005), because the
similarity of the European nations would serve as a natural control variable.
According to the New York Times¸ the amount of state legislative activity regarding
immigration increased since Trump’s inauguration (Chokshi 2017). In other words, the ebb and
flow of state policies regarding noncitizens is ongoing. A possibility for future study suggested
by this is to develop a running tally of state immigration sentiment, or to possibly divide state
immigration policy into different periods, as was done in Chapter Five. These periods could be
based around presidential administrations (Obama’s second term, Trump’s first) to keep a
national-level variable constant. Otherwise, years could be used, so that there is a 2006 to 2010
score, a 2011 to 2015 score, and so forth. Such an approach could uncover changes in the
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behavior of the states, and further research could tie those changes to national events,
demographic shifts, economic cycles, and other factors suggested by literature cited in earlier
chapters.
Epilogue: Immigration and the 2016 Presidential Election

It seems impossible to talk about immigration and political regimes without at least
acknowledging the elections of 2016. It is clear that, whatever elites within the Republican Party
feel about immigration, rank-and-file members of the party do not seem very keen on the
possibility of amnesty and a path to citizenship for America’s millions of unauthorized
noncitizens. Consider this: in September of 2011, Governor Rick Perry of Texas was booed at a
GOP debate for defending his decision to sign a state version of the DREAM Act (Shear 2011),
and that would begin his slide in the GOP primary polls. On the day that Donald Trump
launched his eventually successful campaign for the White House, he highlighted America’s
unauthorized noncitizen population and unauthorized border crossings as problems that he
intended to tackle. Trump’s position on immigration was so far to the right of other candidates,
and so harsh in tone, that many of his competitors for the GOP nomination denounced him,
thereby cementing his status as the hardliner on immigration in the race. On other issues he
shifted position, but not on immigration.
In Márquez and Schraufnagel (2013) and in Chapter Five of this dissertation, I develop a
means of scoring state sentiment on immigration to more clearly differentiate the degree to
which states accommodate and restrict noncitizens. In this Epilogue, I use the sentiment score
and other state-level variables to predict the state popular vote winner in the general election of
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2016. I will specifically avoid polls, because the polls varied in quality from state to state.
Many states that were considered “safe” for one party or the other were largely ignored by the
experienced pollsters. Also, I won’t use President Obama’s approval rating as a variable because
his popularity was not measured in a consistent fashion for all 50 states. Instead, I will focus on
state fundamentals related to partisanship, the economy, and political culture. Then I will report
how the sentiment score stands up among these other measures.
To measure the partisanship of a state, I considered several variables. Márquez and
Schraufnagel (2013) constructed a new variable that combined the governorship and both
chambers of state legislature into one statistic; we employed this score as an explanatory variable
concerning the enactment of state policies. I considered updating this score for 2016, but
decided against it because I am not examining state policies. Instead, I am examining the ability
of one party to win a statewide election for executive office. I also considered the Democrat or
Republican vote total for each state from the previous presidential election, but Obama was not
on the ballot and, even before the election, it seemed intuitive that some Obama supporters might
switch to Trump based on trade policy. Another possibility was to employ a simple dummy
variable for party control of the governorship, but instead I counted the number of years the GOP
had controlled the governorship continuously going into the 2016 elections. Using this
continuous numerical value as an independent variable is superior to a dummy variable because
it measures sustained support for the GOP in an executive office at the statewide level. A
dummy variable representing party control of the governorship would miss this aspect of relative
party strength in a state.
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Hypothesis H1: The number of years that the GOP has controlled the governorship is
directly associated with Trump winning the state’s popular vote.
The condition of a state’s economy undoubtedly plays a role in voting decisions. For
example, Michael Lewsi-Beck and Charles Tien (2016) have used economic growth in their
forecasts. Yet, I am concerned with state-level factors, because the presidential election is not
based on the national vote total, but on the results of 50 state elections (plus Washington, D.C.).
I considered several statistics published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. One was
GDP growth, but the mean state GDP growth from the fourth quarter of 2015 to the second
quarter of 2016 was 1.01 percent. Such a small figure indicates that there was no economic
shockwave that would typically cause the electorate to turn against the incumbent party, as was
the case in 2008. Instead, I use the state GDP for the second quarter of 2016 as a measure of the
economic strength of each state. In previous chapters, I used per capita GDP because of the use
of population size in some of my models; however, here I am not concerned with population
size. Also, it was possible to calculate per capita GDP for 2010 because of the Census, but to do
so in 2016 would require me to calculate a new figure based on estimates of state population. I
anticipate that this variable will be inversely associated with a Trump win in the state, because
states with smaller GDP’s will be drawn to his promises of greater prosperity.
Hypothesis H2: The state GDP is inversely associated with Trump winning the state’s
popular vote.
One variable that is self-evident is the political culture of the state. Some states are more
conservative than others, and these states were more likely to vote for Trump. Patrick I. Fisher
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(2016) uses Daniel Elazar’s subculture classification system in his forecast of the 2016. Fisher’s
choice of these variables was based on how they performed in predicting Trump’s performance
in the GOP primaries. However, there is a substantial difference between the primary electorate
and the general electorate, and Trump was able to win over many doubting GOP voters. Further,
Fisher’s choice of this measure was influenced by Trump’s mediocre performance in Utah, and
polls that showed Clinton tied with Trump in the Beehive State. Fisher probably placed too
much weight on these factors. I will continue using Berry’s citizen ideology score, both for
consistency and because ideology is more relevant to an election than a measure of moralistic
culture in a state. Recall that a higher citizen ideology score means the state is more liberal.
Hypothesis H3: The citizen ideology score is inversely associated with Trump winning the
state’s popular vote.
The urban percentage of a state has been employed in every regression in every chapter
so far, and I see no reason to stop here. Seriously though, there is a cultural, economic, and
demographic divide between urban and rural. It is self-evident that city dwellers see the world
through a different lens than those who do not dwell in cities. James G. Gimpel and Kimberley
A. Karnes (2006) find that the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections revealed an urban-rural
cleavage in voting patterns, with a 20-point gap in presidential preference between urban and
rural voters. I expect that as the urban percentage of a state goes up, support for Trump will go
down.
Hypothesis H4: The urban percentage of a state is inversely associated with Trump
winning the state’s popular vote.
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Finally, I use the sentiment score for 2009 to 2014 that I develop in Chapter Five to test
whether a state’s stance on immigration predicts Donald Trump’s victory in the state. This
statistic was problematic, for reasons that I describe in Chapter Five. The problem isn’t with the
variable itself, though; it’s with the shifting behavior of the states, which in turn reduced the
power of the explanatory variables to predict the score. Yet, despite this, the sentiment score for
the period from 2009 to 2014 gathers enough observations to establish clear differentiation
between each state’s posture on noncitizens. Because of the way the sentiment score is
constructed, I anticipate that as a state’s sentiment on immigration goes up, Trump’s probability
of victory in the state goes down.
Hypothesis H5: The sentiment score for a state is inversely associated with Trump
winning the state’s popular vote.
Table 6-1: Descriptive Statistics Regarding Trump’s Victory
MEAN Stnd. Dev. MIN. VALUE MAX. VALUE
Dependent Variable
Trump wins the state
.6
.49
0 (20 states)
1 (30 states)
Independent Variables
GOP governor years
6.22
8.56
0 (19 states)
37 (SD)
2nd quarter GDP (in millions) 364,094 459,239.70 30,990 (VT) 2,562,217 (CA)
Citizen ideology
48.08
8.81
30.2 (UT)
63.2 (VT)
Urban percentage
79.59
14.56
38.7 (ME)
95 (CA)
Sentiment Score
-9.57
22.23
-53.93 (AZ)
112.23 (CA)

Table 6-1 displays descriptive statistics regarding the variables used. The only new one
is the number of years the GOP had controlled the governorship going into November of 2016.
Nineteen states have a score of zero years, because they did not have a Republican governor on
election day. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the GOP controlled South Dakota’s executive
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mansion for 37 consecutive years. The mean is 5.8, but the standard deviation is 8.33, indicating
a wide distribution among the states with a Republican governor.
The dependent variable has two values: one for a Trump victory in that state, and zero
otherwise. Although Trump won one district in Maine, I am concerned with the state popular
vote, so Maine was coded as a zero. Because the model has a dichotomous dependent variable, a
probit regression will be used. In Chapter Five, citizen ideology was found to be associated with
the sentiment score when the foreign-born or Latino growth rate were used in the model, so there
is a possibility that the assumption of no multicollinearity has been violated. However, when I
test for the variance inflation factor (VIF), I find that none of the variables had a VIF higher than
10, and the mean VIF was 1.50.

Independent Variable
GOP governor years
2nd quarter GDP
Citizen ideology
Urban percentage
Sentiment score

Table 6-2: Predictors of Trump's Success
Expected Sign
+
-

Constant
LR chi2(5)
Psuedo R2
n

Coefficient (s.e.)
.19 (.13)
3.86 (2.15)*
-.37 (.14)**
-.07 (.04)†
-.04 (.02)*
22.42**
52.35***
.77
50

*** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10; † p < .15
Table 6-2 displays the results of the model. The number of years of GOP control over the
governorship is not statistically associated with a Trump victory in the state. This finding is
important because it highlights the role of issues, conditions, and state population characteristics.
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Having said that, 23 of Trump’s 30 states had Republican governors on election day (although at
least one, John Kasich of Ohio, never endorsed Trump). It’s possible that the other variables
used in the model were antecedent to both GOP control of the executive mansion and Trump’s
victory in the state. Second quarter state GDP was directly associated with a Trump victory at p
< .10, but it was predicted to be inversely associated. What may have occurred is that the states
with weaker economies wanted help from the national government, while stronger ones wanted
government to stay out of the way, and therefore tended to favor the candidate who promised to
reduce the size of government. Not surprisingly, citizen ideology was inversely associated with
a Trump victory at p < .05; that is, states with a more liberal population were less likely to go for
Trump. As predicted, urban percentage is inversely associated with a Trump victory at p < .15,
suggesting that rural voters favored Trump; this finding may have been skewed by urban states,
like Utah and Arizona, which backed Trump. Finally, the sentiment score was inversely
associated with a Trump victory at p < .10, meaning that states which pursued restrictions against
noncitizens favored Trump.
Thus, an updated version of an immigration scoring system developed by Márquez and
Schraufnagel (2013) serves as a statistically significant predictor of Trump’s performance in a
state. Put another way, immigration sentiment in the state serves as an indicator of Trump’s
success there, with more restrictive states tending to back Trump. From 2012 to the day Trump
launched his campaign, it seemed as if immigration had taken a backseat to other issues, and that
the tide of state restrictions ebbed. However, Trump managed to identify a wedge issue not only
between Republicans and Democrats, but between hardliners and moderates within the GOP
itself. It’s possible that Trump refocused national attention on the issue and made immigration
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salient again, exposing divisions and anxieties that had bubbled under the surface. Regardless, it
is personally gratifying that our research has, at least partially, stood the test of time.
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